registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @chem-x/create-chemx / 26.9.20-1298

@chem-x/create-chemx@26.9.20-1298

Chemical X Protocol: Private drop-in architecture starter kit and capsule generator

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The postinstall-triggered writes to multiple AI agent configuration surfaces are unconsented lifecycle mutations. This meets the blocking policy for AI agent control-surface hijacking, although the configured server is package-aligned and the inspected source does not establish credential theft.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Installing the package through npm runs its postinstall hook.

Impact

Agents using those configurations may launch the added MCP server.

Mechanism

The hook invokes MCP setup, which writes Cursor and VS Code project configuration and updates an existing global Antigravity configuration with a Chemical X server entry.

Policy narrative

The npm postinstall hook automatically calls MCP setup for the installing project. That setup writes project agent configuration and, when present, the user's global Antigravity configuration. The source shows no consent gate on this lifecycle path, so installing the package changes agent control configuration automatically.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsoncli/postinstall.jscli/mcp/installer.js.cursor/mcp.json.vscode/mcp.json~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 97.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for policy risk

The package defines a postinstall hook that runs its installer.
The hook calls MCP setup for the installing project without a consent check.
MCP setup writes configuration for Cursor and VS Code, and adds a server entry to an existing global Antigravity configuration when that configuration directory exists.

Evidence against

The setup adds a package-aligned Chemical X MCP server entry; inspected code does not show credential collection or unrelated data transmission.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 210 file(s), 1.16 MB of source, external domains: api.github.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, chemicalx.xophz.com, example.com, fallback.com, github.com, img.shields.io, mycompassconsulting.com, reports.chemicalx.xophz.com, unpkg.com, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView file

27patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView on unpkg · L27

27patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27

Critical

Secret Pattern

GitHub personal access token in cli/errors/errors.spec.js

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView on unpkg · L27

cli/audit-preflight-git.jsView file

1import fs from 'node:fs'; L2: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L3:

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli/audit-preflight-git.jsView on unpkg · L1

cli/build/executor.jsView file

11const child = spawn(command, { L12: shell: true, L13: cwd,

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

cli/build/executor.jsView on unpkg · L11

cli/license.jsView file

3import os from 'node:os'; L4: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L5: import { ... L17: L18: export const API_BASE = process.env.CHEMICAL_X_API_URL || 'https://chemicalx.xophz.com'; L19: export const GATEKEEPER_API_URL = process.env.COMPASS_GATEKEEPER_URL || 'https://mycompassconsulting.com/wp-json/compass/v1/gatekeeper';

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

cli/license.jsView on unpkg · L3

cli/mcp/installer.jsView file

1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => { L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} }; L22: ... L30: L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers && typeof parsed.mcpServers === 'object'); L32: if (!hasMcpServersObject) { L33: parsed.mcpServers = {}; L34: } L35: L36: parsed.mcpServers[SERVER_KEY] = serverDef; L37: return JSON.stringify(parsed, null, 2) + '\n'; ... L90: const cursorDir = path.join(resolvedTarget, '.cursor'); Write operation from cli/mcp/installer.js: L20: export const mergeMcpServerConfig = (existingJsonString = '', serverDef = {}) => { L21: let parsed = { mcpServers: {} }; L22: ... L30: L31: const hasMcpServersObject = Boolean(parsed.mcpServers &

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

cli/mcp/installer.jsView on unpkg · L1

cli/pillars-wizard.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. st pick = usegum ? gumchoose(choices, 'select architectural pillars configuration') : await promptquestion('select pillars: [1=recommended, 2=strict, 3=custom, 4=minimal, 5=none] (default: 1): '); if (pick && (pick.startswith('2.') || pick === '2')) { selectedpresetkey = 'strict'; selectedpillarids = [...pillar_presets.strict.pillars]; } else if (pick && (pick.startswith('3.') || pick === '3')) { selectedpresetkey = 'custom'; for (const pillar of pillars) { const defaultchoice = pillar_presets.recommended.pillars.includes(pillar.id) ? 'y/n' : 'y/n'; const isdefaultyes = defaultchoice === 'y/n'; const answer = a

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

cli/pillars-wizard.jsView on unpkg

scripts/pre-commit.shView file

•path = scripts/pre-commit.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 5174 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/pre-commit.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node cli/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView file

27patternName = github_pat severity = critical line = 27

Critical

Critical Secret

Package contains a critical-looking secret pattern.

cli/errors/errors.spec.jsView on unpkg · L27

Findings

3 Critical5 High5 Medium4 Low

CriticalCritical Secretcli/errors/errors.spec.js

CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackcli/mcp/installer.js

CriticalSecret Patterncli/errors/errors.spec.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processcli/audit-preflight-git.js

HighShellcli/build/executor.js

HighSame File Env Network Executioncli/license.js

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationcli/pillars-wizard.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperscripts/pre-commit.sh

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @chem-x/create-chemx@26.9.20-1298.

See all versions of @chem-x/create-chemx for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing @chem-x/create-chemx@26.9.20-1298. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-12 06:05:15.692Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

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Behavioral surface

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Source & flagged code