registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @chemx/create-chemx / 26.9.9-786

@chemx/create-chemx@26.9.9-786

Chemical X Protocol: Private drop-in architecture starter kit and capsule generator

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The source shows user-invoked scaffolding that writes agent directives into the generated project, so this merits a warning for agent configuration capability. The manifest has no install hook, and the inspected behavior does not establish a concrete attack.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

A user invokes the create command and completes the scaffold flow.

Impact

The generated project receives directives that may influence an AI coding agent working there.

Mechanism

The CLI downloads starter files and writes them into the selected project directory, then creates a .cursorrules file if one is absent.

AI rationale

Evidence

cli/index.js.cursorrules

Network endpoints1

chemicalx.xophz.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package exposes a CLI whose create command runs the scaffold flow.
Scaffolding fetches license-gated files from an API endpoint, then writes them into the chosen project directory.
Scaffolding also creates a .cursorrules file that supplies directives to an AI coding agent.

Evidence against

The manifest declares no install lifecycle hooks; the scaffold runs through the CLI.
The agent configuration write occurs as part of an explicit scaffold command, and the source does not establish a broader control-surface mutation or confirmed attack.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 2 file(s), 28.4 KB of source, external domains: chemicalx.xophz.com, mycompassconsulting.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

cli/index.jsView file

Lines 1-54javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3import fs from "node:fs";

4import path from "node:path";

5import os from "node:os";

6import readline from "node:readline";

7import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

8import { runAudit as executeAstAudit, auditFile } from "./audit.js";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

10const rawArgs = process.argv.slice(2);

11const invokedBin = path.basename(process.argv[1] || "");

12const isCreateInvoked =

13 invokedBin.includes("create-chemx") || (rawArgs[0] && rawArgs[0] === "create");

15const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".chemical-x");

16const CONFIG_FILE = path.join(CONFIG_DIR, "config.json");

17const DEVICE_FILE = path.join(CONFIG_DIR, "device_id");

19const API_BASE = process.env.CHEMICAL_X_API_URL || "https://chemicalx.xophz.com";

20const URL_LEARN = "https://chemicalx.xophz.com";

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

21const URL_STANDARD = "https://mycompassconsulting.com/buy/chemical-x/standard";

22const URL_MASTER = "https://mycompassconsulting.com/buy/chemical-x/master";

24if (!fs.existsSync(CONFIG_DIR)) {

25 try {

26 fs.mkdirSync(CONFIG_DIR, { recursive: true });

27 } catch {}

28}

30const openBrowser = (url) => {

31 const platform = process.platform;

32 try {

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

33 if (platform === "darwin") spawnSync("open", [url], { stdio: "ignore" });

34 else if (platform === "win32")

35 spawnSync("cmd.exe", ["/c", "start", '""', url], { stdio: "ignore" });

36 else spawnSync("xdg-open", [url], { stdio: "ignore" });

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L34

37 } catch {}

38};

40const hasGum = () => {

41 try {

42 return spawnSync("which", ["gum"], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0;

43 } catch {

44 return false;

45 }

46};

48const gumChoose = (options, header = "") => {

49 const args = ["choose"];

50 if (header) {

51 args.push(`--header=${header}`, "--header.foreground=81");

52 }

53 args.push("--cursor.foreground=81", ...options);

54 const res = spawnSync("gum", args, { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["inherit", "pipe", "inherit"] });

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. method: "post", headers: { "content-type": "application/json" }, body: json.stringify({ licensekey: normalizedkey, deviceid }) }); const responsedata = await res.json(); if (!res.ok || !responsedata.valid) { process.stderr.write( `\x1b[31m✕ license verification failed: ${responsedata.error || "invalid key."}\x1b[0m\n` ); process.stderr.write(`purchase key at: ${url_standard}\n\n`); process.exit(1); } savelicensekey(normalizedkey); process.stdout.write( `\x1b[32m✔ verified license for @${responsedata.githubuser || "sponsor"}\x1b[0m\n\n` ); return responsedata.files || {}; } catch (err) { pr

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

cli/index.jsView file

6import readline from "node:readline"; L7: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L8: import { runAudit as executeAstAudit, auditFile } from "./audit.js";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

34else if (platform === "win32") L35: spawnSync("cmd.exe", ["/c", "start", '""', url], { stdio: "ignore" }); L36: else spawnSync("xdg-open", [url], { stdio: "ignore" });

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L34

6import readline from "node:readline"; L7: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L8: import { runAudit as executeAstAudit, auditFile } from "./audit.js"; ... L18: L19: const API_BASE = process.env.CHEMICAL_X_API_URL || "https://chemicalx.xophz.com"; L20: const URL_LEARN = "https://chemicalx.xophz.com";

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

cli/index.jsView on unpkg · L6

Findings

5 High3 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processcli/index.js

HighShellcli/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executioncli/index.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitycli/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationcli/index.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowNo License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @chemx/create-chemx@26.9.9-786.

See all versions of @chemx/create-chemx for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @chemx/create-chemx@26.9.9-786 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-12 06:37:25.056Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

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Behavioral surface

Related packages

More from @chemx

Source & flagged code