--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@circuitwall/jarela" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@circuitwall/jarela/v/1.31.2.md" package: "@circuitwall/jarela" report_status: "published" title: "@circuitwall/jarela@1.31.2 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.31.2" --- # @circuitwall/jarela@1.31.2 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 24 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 1.31.2 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The running application exposes local file reading and a self-update action. The routes show no authorization enforcement themselves, so any party able to reach the server may invoke these capabilities. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-01T11:03:25.819Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-01T11:06:33.933Z - **Download time:** 3280 ms - **Static scan time:** 43310 ms - **AI review time:** 141521 ms - **Total time:** 188114 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The running application exposes local file reading and a self-update action. The routes show no authorization enforcement themselves, so any party able to reach the server may invoke these capabilities. - **Trigger:** A request to the running application's local-file or update API. - **Impact:** Local file disclosure and an unwanted package update; explicit service installation can make the application persist for the current user. - **Evidence paths:** app/api/v1/local-file/route.ts, app/api/v1/update/apply/route.ts, scripts/service-install.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-01T11:06:33.933Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Caller-selected file reads and fixed-target global npm self-update. - **Rationale:** This is not evidenced as malware: install hooks do not invoke persistence or exfiltration, and risky actions are in the running application's features. However, unauthenticated-looking file access and self-update endpoints are concrete high-risk application behavior that warrants a warning. ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Critical Vulnerability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** The update API builds a fixed global npm install command for the package's latest release and spawns it on POST., The local-file API resolves caller-supplied paths and returns up to 16 KiB of readable file content without an authorization check in this route., The service installer can create and enable a per-user systemd service that restarts the application., The package has automatic prepare and postinstall hooks, although the postinstall target is a hint script., The health probes send configured credentials only to the corresponding configured integration or provider endpoint., Bundled dependency artifacts account for the scanner's eval and serialization findings; the inspected package code is not a hidden payload carrier. - **Evidence against:** No runtime dependency on @circuitwall/jarela itself appears in package.json., The lifecycle postinstall invokes scripts/postinstall-hint.mjs, not the service installer or updater., Service registration is reached through the explicit jarela install-service command., The update command and update route use fixed package and repository targets rather than caller-controlled shell text., No package-owned endpoint for collected credentials was found in the inspected probe code. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @circuitwall/jarela@1.31.2. - Review the evidence and your use of @circuitwall/jarela@1.31.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall-hint.mjs ``` ### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** app/api/v1/update/apply/route.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L19: import { join } from "node:path"; L20: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L21: import { NextResponse } from "next/server"; ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** app/api/v1/local-file/route.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L137: const child = process.platform === "win32" L138: ? spawn("powershell.exe", ["-NoProfile", "-Command", "Start-Process -LiteralPath $args[0]", abs], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore", windowsHide: true }) L139: : process.platform === "darwin" ``` ### 6. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/next/dist/compiled/browserslist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic code evaluation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: (()=>{var __webpack_modules__={368:e=>{function BrowserslistError(e){this.name="BrowserslistError";this.message=e;this.browserslist=true;if(Error.captureStackTrace){Error.captureSt... ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** scripts/start-prod.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L31: try { L32: const { optimizeClientChunksOnce } = await import("./optimize-client-chunks.mjs"); L33: await optimizeClientChunksOnce(); ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** lib/documents/remote/upsert.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L1: // Shared upsert path for remote document sources (ADR-0026). L2: // ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** scripts/service-install.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L18: L19: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L20: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, rmSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs"; ... L45: for (const k of PROXY_ENV_KEYS) { L46: const v = process.env[k]; L47: if (v && v.length > 0) out[k] = v; ... L59: if (env && env.length > 0) { L60: return env.startsWith("~") ? env.replace(/^~/, homedir()) : env; L61: } ... L93: if (!existsSync(kc)) continue; L94: let stdout; L95: try { ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** scripts/update.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; L14: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L15: import { join } from "node:path"; ... L18: const REPO = "CircuitWall/jarela"; L19: const REGISTRY_URL = `https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE_NAME}/latest`; L20: const GH_COMMIT_URL = `https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/commits/main`; ... L24: function resolveChannel() { L25: return (process.env.JARELA_UPDATE_CHANNEL ?? "").trim().toLowerCase() === "main" ? "main" : "stable"; L26: } ``` ### 14. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** lib/health/probes.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L12: import { resolvePackageAuth } from "@/lib/tools/auth-registry"; L13: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L14: import type { AtlassianAuth } from "@circuitwall/atlassian-langchain"; ... L22: import { registerDefaultPackages } from "@/lib/tools/default-packages"; L23: if (process.env.NEXT_PHASE !== "phase-production-build") { L24: registerDefaultPackages(); ... L95: try { L96: const res = await fetch(`${auth.url}/rest/api/3/myself`, { L97: headers: { L98: Authorization: "Basic " + Buffer.from(`${auth.email}:${auth.apiToken}`).toString("base64"), L99: Accept: "application/json", ... L195: try { ``` ### 15. Critical: Remote Response Code Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/next/dist/compiled/jest-worker/threadChild.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: (()=>{"use strict";var __webpack_modules__={994:(e,r)=>{Object.defineProperty(r,"__esModule",{value:true});r.PARENT_MESSAGE_SETUP_ERROR=r.PARENT_MESSAGE_OK=r.PARENT_MESSAGE_CUSTOM=... ``` ### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** scripts/service-install.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> scripts/jarela-bin.mjs -> scripts/service-install.mjs L18: L19: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L20: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, rmSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs"; ... L45: for (const k of PROXY_ENV_KEYS) { L46: const v = process.env[k]; L47: if (v && v.length > 0) out[k] = v; ... L59: if (env && env.length > 0) { L60: return env.startsWith("~") ? env.replace(/^~/, homedir()) : env; L61: } ... L93: if (!existsSync(kc)) continue; L94: let stdout; L95: try { ``` ### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 18. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 19. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64/lib/libvips-cpp.so.8.18.3 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = .next/standalone/node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64/lib/libvips-cpp.so.8.18.3 kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 18195640 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 20. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/installed-launcher.ps1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = scripts/installed-launcher.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 9857 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. High: Payload In Excluded Dir - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/8825.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/8825.js kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 6071179 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/8825.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/8825.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 6071179 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/@keyv/serialize/dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 87 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 36 - **Optional dependencies:** 1 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 18 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 37 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.122.0 (Dependency) - @circuitwall/atlassian-langchain ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - @circuitwall/github-langchain ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - @circuitwall/icloud-langchain ^0.1.1 (Dependency) - @circuitwall/jira-align-langchain ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - @circuitwall/ms-todo-langchain ^0.1.0 (Dependency) - @langchain/cohere ^1.0.5 (Dependency) - @langchain/core ^1.2.9 (Dependency) - @langchain/deepseek ^1.1.10 (Dependency) - @langchain/google-genai ^2.3.0 (Dependency) - @langchain/langgraph ^1.4.13 (Dependency) - @langchain/langgraph-checkpoint ^1.1.5 (Dependency) - @langchain/mcp-adapters ^1.1.4 (Dependency) - @tailwindcss/postcss ^4.3.0 (Dependency) - @whiskeysockets/baileys ^7.0.0-rc13 (Dependency) - autoprefixer ^10.5.0 (Dependency) - cron-parser ^5.10.0 (Dependency) - cross-spawn ^7.0.6 (Dependency) - highlight.js ^11.12.0 (Dependency) - lucide-react ^1.35.0 (Dependency) - next ^16.3.3 (Dependency) - openai ^7.8.0 (Dependency) - postcss ^8.5.26 (Dependency) - qrcode ^1.5.4 (Dependency) - react ^19.2.8 (Dependency) - react-dom ^19.2.8 (Dependency) - react-markdown ^10.1.0 (Dependency) - rehype-highlight ^7.0.2 (Dependency) - rehype-raw ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - rehype-sanitize ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - remark-gfm ^4.0.1 (Dependency) - simple-icons ^16.23.0 (Dependency) - tailwindcss ^4.3.0 (Dependency) - undici ^8.3.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.3 (Dependency) - zod ^4.5.1 (Dependency) - @napi-rs/keyring ^1.3.0 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @circuitwall/jarela - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.31.2 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-01T11:01:45.563Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-04T09:27:37.488Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-02T00:20:05.774Z - **Known versions:** 36 - **Latest version:** 1.42.3 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Jarela — local chat interface for LangGraph agents (multi-provider, single-process, SQLite-backed). - **Author:** Andrew Ge Wu - **Maintainers:** andrew-ge-wu - **Keywords:** langgraph, llm, chat, agents, mcp, anthropic, openai, google-genai, cohere, deepseek, self-hosted, local-first - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22 - **Artifact files:** 5976 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 237,098,749 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()