--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@circuitwall/jarela/v/1.41.5" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@circuitwall/jarela/v/1.41.5.md" package: "@circuitwall/jarela" report_status: "published" title: "@circuitwall/jarela@1.41.5 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.41.5" --- # @circuitwall/jarela@1.41.5 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — The proxy can obtain Gmail access tokens and act within the OAuth scopes granted by the user. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 1.41.5 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The default Gmail OAuth path routes authorization-code and refresh-token exchanges through a package-controlled proxy. This gives that external service access to renewable Gmail credentials. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-11T20:54:49.275Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-11T20:56:43.415Z - **Download time:** 3796 ms - **Static scan time:** 37084 ms - **AI review time:** 73258 ms - **Total time:** 114140 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The default Gmail OAuth path routes authorization-code and refresh-token exchanges through a package-controlled proxy. This gives that external service access to renewable Gmail credentials. - **Trigger:** A user connects Gmail using the bundled default OAuth client or subsequently uses Gmail features. - **Impact:** The proxy can obtain Gmail access tokens and act within the OAuth scopes granted by the user. - **Evidence paths:** lib/integrations/gmail-oauth.ts, app/api/v1/integrations/gmail/oauth/callback/route.ts - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-11T20:56:43.415Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Posts OAuth authorization and refresh credentials to a vendor-controlled token proxy. - **Attack narrative:** After a user authorizes the bundled Gmail client, the callback passes the authorization code and PKCE verifier to a Jarela Cloud Run proxy. The application then persists the resulting refresh token and posts it to that same proxy whenever it needs an access token. The proxy is not a Google endpoint and can therefore receive renewable user credentials and mint access tokens. - **Rationale:** The package implements a default route that sends OAuth authorization material and refresh tokens to a package-controlled external host. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration surface, despite unrelated lifecycle hooks being limited. - **Files touched:** lib/integrations/gmail-oauth.ts, app/api/v1/integrations/gmail/oauth/callback/route.ts - **Network endpoints:** https://jarela-oauth-proxy-134669812881.europe-west1.run.app ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** The bundled Gmail client defaults to a Jarela-controlled Cloud Run token proxy., The runtime sends the stored Gmail refresh token to that proxy to obtain access tokens., The default OAuth callback exchanges the user authorization code through the same proxy. - **Evidence against:** The postinstall hook only prints a global-install hint and exits in local installs., Autostart persistence is reachable only through an explicit CLI command or interactive prompt., No runtime dependency on this package's own name is declared. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @circuitwall/jarela@1.41.5. - Avoid installing @circuitwall/jarela@1.41.5. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall-hint.mjs ``` ### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** app/api/v1/update/apply/route.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L19: import { join } from "node:path"; L20: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L21: import { NextResponse } from "next/server"; ``` ### 5. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** app/api/v1/local-file/route.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L137: const child = process.platform === "win32" L138: ? spawn("powershell.exe", ["-NoProfile", "-Command", "Start-Process -LiteralPath $args[0]", abs], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore", windowsHide: true }) L139: : process.platform === "darwin" ``` ### 6. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/next/dist/compiled/browserslist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic code evaluation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: (()=>{var __webpack_modules__={368:e=>{function BrowserslistError(e){this.name="BrowserslistError";this.message=e;this.browserslist=true;if(Error.captureStackTrace){Error.captureSt... ``` ### 7. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** browser-extension/agent-overlay.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L57: let applyBrand = null; L58: const brandReady = import(chrome.runtime.getURL("lib/brand.mjs")) L59: .then((m) => { ``` ### 8. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** lib/embeddings/index.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L51: L52: const explicitName = process.env.EMBEDDING_MODEL_CONFIG; L53: // 1) explicit embedding model name (if provided). ... L93: function embeddingCacheKey(modelId: string, text: string): string { L94: return `${modelId}\u0000${createHash("sha1").update(text).digest("base64")}`; L95: } ``` ### 9. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 10. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 11. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** scripts/service-install.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L18: L19: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L20: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, rmSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs"; ... L45: for (const k of PROXY_ENV_KEYS) { L46: const v = process.env[k]; L47: if (v && v.length > 0) out[k] = v; ... L59: if (env && env.length > 0) { L60: return env.startsWith("~") ? env.replace(/^~/, homedir()) : env; L61: } ... L93: if (!existsSync(kc)) continue; L94: let stdout; L95: try { ``` ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** scripts/update.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; L14: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L15: import { join } from "node:path"; ... L18: const REPO = "CircuitWall/jarela"; L19: const REGISTRY_URL = `https://registry.npmjs.org/${PACKAGE_NAME}/latest`; L20: const GH_COMMIT_URL = `https://api.github.com/repos/${REPO}/commits/main`; ... L24: function resolveChannel() { L25: return (process.env.JARELA_UPDATE_CHANNEL ?? "").trim().toLowerCase() === "main" ? "main" : "stable"; L26: } ``` ### 14. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** lib/health/probes.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L12: import { resolvePackageAuth } from "@/lib/tools/runtime/auth-registry"; L13: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L14: ... L25: import { registerDefaultPackages } from "@/lib/tools/packages/default-packages"; L26: if (process.env.NEXT_PHASE !== "phase-production-build") { L27: registerDefaultPackages(); ... L107: try { L108: const res = await fetch(`${auth.url}/rest/api/3/myself`, { L109: headers: { L110: Authorization: "Basic " + Buffer.from(`${auth.email}:${auth.apiToken}`).toString("base64"), L111: Accept: "application/json", ... L207: try { ``` ### 15. Critical: Remote Response Code Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/next/dist/compiled/jest-worker/threadChild.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: (()=>{"use strict";var __webpack_modules__={994:(e,r)=>{Object.defineProperty(r,"__esModule",{value:true});r.PARENT_MESSAGE_SETUP_ERROR=r.PARENT_MESSAGE_OK=r.PARENT_MESSAGE_CUSTOM=... ``` ### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** scripts/service-install.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> scripts/jarela-bin.mjs -> scripts/service-install.mjs L18: L19: import { spawnSync, execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L20: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync, rmSync, chmodSync } from "node:fs"; ... L45: for (const k of PROXY_ENV_KEYS) { L46: const v = process.env[k]; L47: if (v && v.length > 0) out[k] = v; ... L59: if (env && env.length > 0) { L60: return env.startsWith("~") ? env.replace(/^~/, homedir()) : env; L61: } ... L93: if (!existsSync(kc)) continue; L94: let stdout; L95: try { ``` ### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 18. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 19. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64/lib/libvips-cpp.so.8.18.6 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = .next/standalone/node_modules/@img/sharp-libvips-linux-x64/lib/libvips-cpp.so.8.18.6 kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 18621496 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 20. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/installed-launcher.ps1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = scripts/installed-launcher.ps1 kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 9904 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. High: Payload In Excluded Dir - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/5210.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/5210.js kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 6080560 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 22. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/5210.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = .next/standalone/.next/server/chunks/5210.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 6080560 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 23. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 24. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** .next/standalone/node\_modules/@keyv/serialize/dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 83 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 33 - **Optional dependencies:** 1 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 18 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 34 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.122.0 (Dependency) - @langchain/cohere ^1.0.5 (Dependency) - @langchain/core ^1.2.9 (Dependency) - @langchain/deepseek ^1.1.10 (Dependency) - @langchain/google-genai ^2.3.0 (Dependency) - @langchain/langgraph ^1.4.13 (Dependency) - @langchain/langgraph-checkpoint ^1.1.5 (Dependency) - @langchain/mcp-adapters ^1.1.4 (Dependency) - @tailwindcss/postcss ^4.3.0 (Dependency) - @whiskeysockets/baileys ^7.0.0-rc13 (Dependency) - autoprefixer ^10.5.0 (Dependency) - cron-parser ^5.10.0 (Dependency) - cross-spawn ^7.0.6 (Dependency) - dompurify ^3.4.15 (Dependency) - highlight.js ^11.12.0 (Dependency) - lucide-react ^1.35.0 (Dependency) - mermaid ^11.17.2 (Dependency) - next ^16.3.3 (Dependency) - openai ^7.8.0 (Dependency) - postcss ^8.5.26 (Dependency) - qrcode ^1.5.4 (Dependency) - react ^19.2.8 (Dependency) - react-dom ^19.2.8 (Dependency) - react-markdown ^10.1.0 (Dependency) - rehype-highlight ^7.0.2 (Dependency) - rehype-raw ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - rehype-sanitize ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - remark-gfm ^4.0.1 (Dependency) - simple-icons ^16.23.0 (Dependency) - tailwindcss ^4.3.0 (Dependency) - undici ^8.3.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.3 (Dependency) - zod ^4.5.1 (Dependency) - @napi-rs/keyring ^1.3.0 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @circuitwall/jarela - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.41.5 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-11T20:42:23.165Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-04T09:27:37.488Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-02T00:20:05.774Z - **Known versions:** 36 - **Latest version:** 1.42.3 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Jarela — local chat interface for LangGraph agents (multi-provider, single-process, SQLite-backed). - **Author:** Andrew Ge Wu - **Keywords:** langgraph, llm, chat, agents, mcp, anthropic, openai, google-genai, cohere, deepseek, self-hosted, local-first - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22 - **Artifact files:** 6418 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 268,761,346 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()