@clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.556
Standalone clawd daemon — Claude Code (and future Codex) session server over WebSocket
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo install-time malware behavior was found, but default remote telemetry sends runtime records and stable installation identity to a package-selected endpoint. This is a concrete conditional data-exposure risk rather than evidence of malware intent.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The executable enables log shipping by default, selects a package-owned remote endpoint, and posts batches of runtime log records there.
- Daemon startup includes a persistent owner and device identifier in the log client identity, so shipped records are attributable to the local installation.
- package.json has no npm preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The log client redacts metadata fields whose keys look like tokens, secrets, passwords, auth values, or API keys, and shipping can be disabled.
Source & flagged code
19 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L21117Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L24908Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.556.
See all versions of @clawos-dev/clawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.556 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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