@clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.566
Standalone clawd daemon — Claude Code (and future Codex) session server over WebSocket
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active CLI path forwards an existing login credential to a destination that is configurable without an allowlist. This is a dangerous credential-forwarding capability, but the trigger is explicit user execution and there is no concrete malicious install hook.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package exposes dist/cli.cjs as its executable and starts its daemon when that CLI is run.
- The CLI accepts a clawos API URL from a command-line flag, environment variable, or config file without destination validation.
- The daemon reads a stored login pass and sends it as a Bearer token to URLs built from that configurable API base.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The credential forwarding occurs after an explicit CLI invocation, not at package installation or import.
Source & flagged code
19 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L21117Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L24920Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.566.
See all versions of @clawos-dev/clawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.566 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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