@clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.574
Standalone clawd daemon — Claude Code (and future Codex) session server over WebSocket
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package exposes a guarded mechanism that installs and executes extension-provided commands, while lacking npm lifecycle hooks and requiring an owner principal. Static inspection does not show a concrete covert payload or unconsented installation attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI installs a supplied extension archive and opens it immediately.
- The extension runtime executes the installed manifest's start command through a shell with inherited environment variables.
- This is an owner-only RPC capability, but the supplied archive can contain executable extension content.
- package.json declares no npm install lifecycle hook.
- The installer verifies the supplied archive hash and rejects unsafe archive paths.
- The installation handler requires an owner principal.
Source & flagged code
18 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L21117Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L24865Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.574.
See all versions of @clawos-dev/clawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.574 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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