@clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.652
Standalone clawd daemon — Claude Code (and future Codex) session server over WebSocket
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiGuest runners receive the owner’s Anthropic credentials without a credential-specific consent check, creating conditional exposure to guest-controlled prompts. Public-persona and send-grant checks restrict access, but do not establish consent to share those credentials; direct exfiltration is not shown.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Guest Claude setup reads the owner’s settings and selects string-valued Anthropic environment entries and an API key helper.
- Guest Claude runner setup merges those credentials into its settings, which are passed to Claude as command-line settings.
- A guest dispatch carries the guest’s prompt into a guest runner; dispatch requires a public persona and a send grant.
Source & flagged code
15 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L30858Package source references dynamic code evaluation.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L9420Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.652.
See all versions of @clawos-dev/clawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.652 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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