@clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.679
Standalone clawd daemon — Claude Code (and future Codex) session server over WebSocket
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and inspected runtime configuration writes are tied to an active subscription channel. Scanner similarity labels and size limits did not establish malicious behavior in the inspected excerpts.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and has no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- The flagged CLI location appends a turn-duration record to a Claude session transcript when that file exists.
- Subscription-channel configuration writes are called when a channel is activated, and the active saved channel is reapplied at daemon startup.
- The flagged MCP server locations point to an app-builder collection helper or contain bundled module boilerplate; the inspected excerpts show no attack behavior.
- The flagged guest asset excerpt is minified client-side utility code, not evidence of a package attack.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkg · L30858Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsView on unpkgPackage source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/app-builder-plugin/mcp-server.cjsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.679.
See all versions of @clawos-dev/clawd for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @clawos-dev/clawd@0.2.679 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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