@cliphijack/santaclaude@1.0.121
SantaClaude 커넥터 — 클라우드 예약을 내 로컬 Claude(tmux)에 발사
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a high-risk, explicit-user-command AI-agent integration with persistent global hooks, project instruction mutation, and screen relay. It is not an install-time attack because the manifest contains no lifecycle scripts, so it should be warned rather than blocked.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Running the CLI enables several global Claude hooks by default.
- The installed SessionStart hook uses an AI model to derive rules from prior transcripts, then changes and commits the project's CLAUDE.md.
- The connector sends captured tmux screens to santaclaude.app during its heartbeat.
- When run through npx, it obtains and executes a server-selected release of itself.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- The behavior starts only after an explicit CLI connect or run command, not package installation.
- The hook scripts and configuration writes are visible in source rather than obfuscated.
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
bundled-superpowers/skills/brainstorming/scripts/server.cjsView on unpkg · L536Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
bundled-superpowers/skills/brainstorming/scripts/server.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cliphijack/santaclaude@1.0.121.
See all versions of @cliphijack/santaclaude for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cliphijack/santaclaude@1.0.121 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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