@cloop/runner@0.2.3
Make your machine and your agents Cloop runners: device login, the runner daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks.
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source supports a warning for the runner's broad, full-access Codex capability. Setup is user-invoked and discloses the behavior, so the inspected evidence does not justify blocking publication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes a CLI and lists build and development scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI starts the connect flow only when the user runs the connect command.
- The Codex driver always adds a flag that bypasses approvals and sandboxing.
- Connecting a local runner registers the device and saves the selected driver configuration.
- The CLI says Codex tasks run without permission checks.
- The full-access behavior is part of the configured runner feature and is disclosed during setup; inspected source does not establish an unrequested attack.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-KKFRQ4HQ.jsView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-KKFRQ4HQ.jsView on unpkg · L29Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cloop/runner@0.2.3.
See all versions of @cloop/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cloop/runner@0.2.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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