@cloop/runner@0.2.7
Make your machine and your agents Cloop runners: device login, the runner daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks.
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the flagged process execution is reachable through explicit product commands. The inspected runtime package invocation runs this package's own background service, while takeover resumes a selected session; the scanner signals do not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines a CLI binary and ordinary build scripts, with no lifecycle hook.
- dist/index.js loads the install handler only for the explicit install subcommand.
- dist/install-HTDTCELB.js registers the Cloop MCP server with Claude Code and prints optional hook configuration.
- dist/disconnect-VTIIRAIV.js gates box cleanup behind --yes and operates on the runner's service and state files.
- dist/index.js loads takeover only for the explicit takeover subcommand; dist/chunk-DLFNATEZ.js resumes the selected Claude Code or Codex session in its repository.
- dist/chunk-X7MNNKU3.js uses npx to run the same @cloop/runner version for its own background runner service when connecting.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/install-HTDTCELB.jsView on unpkg · L6Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/disconnect-VTIIRAIV.jsView on unpkg · L30Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cloop/runner@0.2.7.
See all versions of @cloop/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cloop/runner@0.2.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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