@cloop/runner@0.3.13
Make your machine and your agents Cloop runners: device login, the runner daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks.
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged session-file access feeds the runner’s presence feature, and the inspected source does not show credential collection or an unrelated recipient. The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the remaining flagged behavior did not establish a concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and has no install lifecycle hook.
- The runner reads recent Claude session metadata and includes it in its periodic presence update when other-thread sharing is enabled.
- The inspected dependency files show MCP server transport code and the ws package’s normal client and server implementation; no install scripts were indicated.
- Session sharing is part of the runner’s presence behavior; the inspected source does not establish an unrelated recipient or credential transfer.
- The flagged child-process helper runs supplied steps, while the other flagged file handles local run records.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-6OWQEIFN.jsView on unpkg · L17Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
dist/chunk-T3B3OPMM.jsView on unpkg · L31Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cloop/runner@0.3.13.
See all versions of @cloop/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cloop/runner@0.3.13 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.