@cloop/runner@0.3.18
Make your machine and your agents Cloop runners: device login, the runner daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged execution is part of the package’s disclosed runner behavior, activated by the user’s connect command. The inspected manifest has no install hook, and the reviewed source did not establish a separate attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes dist/index.js as the CLI and declares no lifecycle hooks.
- The runner connects only through the explicit connect command; local setup reports that tasks run without permission checks.
- Codex’s bypass flags are part of the runner’s task execution command, consistent with that disclosed behavior.
- The inspected dependency paths show MCP server and WebSocket implementation code, with no install scripts in their manifests.
- The runner deliberately starts Codex with approval and sandbox protections bypassed.
- The box command reads recent Claude session metadata, which may be shared as part of runner functionality.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedThis package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/chunk-HVXCQQWG.jsView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-HVXCQQWG.jsView on unpkg · L71Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cloop/runner@0.3.18.
See all versions of @cloop/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cloop/runner@0.3.18 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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