@cloop/runner@0.3.36
Make your computer and your agents Cloop machines: device login, the machine daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks.
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install lifecycle scripts, and the flagged shell execution belongs to the `cloop connect` agent setup flow. The inspected installer fetches Claude Code from claude.ai, consistent with the package’s stated purpose; no concrete malicious behavior was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json declares no install, preinstall or postinstall lifecycle scripts.
- The CLI dispatches agent setup through the explicit `cloop connect` command.
- The installer flow fetches Claude Code’s installer from `claude.ai`, and the code identifies it as Anthropic’s installer.
- The connect flow can run shell commands and install or update coding-agent tools; this is a meaningful runtime capability, but it is part of the package’s stated machine setup purpose.
- The package communicates with Cloop’s service as part of its stated login and machine-registration functions.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-SBYSVZ7J.jsView on unpkg · L84Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
dist/chunk-OJH72SCM.jsView on unpkg · L48Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cloop/runner@0.3.36.
See all versions of @cloop/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cloop/runner@0.3.36 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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