@cloop/runner@0.3.37
Make your computer and your agents Cloop machines: device login, the machine daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks.
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest contains no install lifecycle hook, and the flagged command execution is reached through the user-selected `cloop connect` workflow. Its detected downloads install coding agents from their official vendor sources, consistent with the package’s stated purpose.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package has no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle hook; its scripts are build and development tasks.
- The executable dispatches `connect` to its connection workflow only when that command is selected.
- The connection workflow supports installing missing agent tools as part of setting up a Cloop machine.
- The Claude Code installer uses Anthropic’s official `claude.ai` installer endpoint.
- The connection workflow can run shell commands that download and execute the official Claude Code installer, and can install Codex during setup.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-WC72IBTN.jsView on unpkg · L16Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
dist/chunk-G35UCZVP.jsView on unpkg · L48Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @cloop/runner@0.3.37.
See all versions of @cloop/runner for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @cloop/runner@0.3.37 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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