@co0ontty/wand@4.57.0: Malicious npm security report (Block)

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@co0ontty/wand@4.57.0: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

25 flagged

dist/config.jsView file

Lines 60-100javascript

60 if (process.platform === "win32") {

61 return process.env.COMSPEC || "cmd.exe";

62 }

63 try {

64 const loginShell = os.userInfo().shell?.trim();

65 if (loginShell)

66 return loginShell;

67 }

68 catch {

69 // userInfo() throws when the process has no passwd entry.

70 }

71 const envShell = process.env.SHELL?.trim();

72 if (envShell)

73 return envShell;

74 return process.platform === "darwin" ? "/bin/zsh" : "/bin/bash";

75}

76export const defaultConfig = () => ({

77 host: "127.0.0.1",

78 port: 8443,

79 https: false,

80 password: "change-me",

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/config.jsView on unpkg · L80

81 defaultProvider: "claude",

82 defaultSessionKind: "structured",

83 defaultTaskWorktree: true,

84 // 非 root 启动时才有资格用 Claude 的 permission-bypass（root 会被 Claude CLI 拒绝），

85 // 所以这种环境下把默认执行模式抬到「托管」——开箱即得自动确认权限的全自主体验。

86 // root 启动则保守回落到「default」（托管在 root 下也只能降级成 acceptEdits）。

87 // 注意：defaultMode 是偏好字段，只存 SQLite、不写 config.json（见 stripPreferenceFields），

88 // 这里仅作为「用户从未在设置里显式选过模式」时的回落值——显式选择始终优先。

89 defaultMode: isRunningAsRoot() ? "default" : "managed",

90 shell: resolveDefaultShell(),

91 defaultCwd: process.cwd(),

92 startupCommands: [],

93 allowedCommandPrefixes: [],

94 shortcutLogMaxBytes: 10 * 1024 * 1024,

95 language: "",

96 android: defaultAndroidApkConfig(),

97 macos: defaultMacosDmgConfig(),

98 ios: defaultIosIpaConfig(),

99 cardDefaults: defaultCardExpandDefaults(),

100 defaultModel: "",

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1import { mkdir } from "node:fs/promises";

2import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";

3import { createServer } from "node:net";

4import { spawn } from

dist/git-utils.jsView file

Lines 14-54javascript

14 GIT_ASKPASS: "true",

15 GCM_INTERACTIVE: "never",

16 SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE: "never",

17 GIT_EDITOR: "true",

18 GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR:

dist/tui/layout.jsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1import { createRequire } from "node:module";

2import { stripAnsi } from "../pty-text-utils.js";

3const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);

dist/password-manager.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import crypto from "node:crypto";

2export const DEFAULT_BROWSER_EXTENSION_BASE_URL = "https://home.huniu.fun:8183";

3export const DEFAULT_PASSWORD_VAULT_ID = "personal"

dist/tui/commands.jsView file

Lines 1-24javascript

1/**

2 * TUI 运维操作命令集合。

3 *

4 * 所有命令统一返回 CommandResult，UI 层负责把结果渲染到 toast / 弹窗 / 日志。

5 * 命令本身不直接写 stdout / stderr —— TUI 模式下 stderr 已经被 log-bus 劫持。

6 */

7import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

8import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from

browser-extension/src/background.jsView file

•A browser extension granted access to all pages captures login passwords and POSTs vault records to a package-defined external default service. browser-extension/manifest.json: "<all_urls>" "service_worker": "src/background.js", "content_scripts": [ "<all_urls>" browser-extension/shared/url-tools.mjs: export const DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://home.huniu.fun:8183"; if (!raw) return DEFAULT_BASE_URL; if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") return DEFAULT_BASE_URL; return DEFAULT_BASE_URL; const parsed = new URL(raw.includes("://") ? raw : `https://${raw}`); browser-extension/src/background.js: return { login: await loginAndAttach(message.baseUrl, message.password) }; body: JSON.stringify(message.item) body: JSON.stringify(message.item) body: JSON.stringify({ secret: m

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

browser-extension/src/background.jsView on unpkg

Critical

Browser Credential Phishing

Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.

browser-extension/src/background.js

dist/npm-update-utils.jsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1/**

2 * npm 全局更新通用辅助。

3 *

4 * 共用于 server.ts 的 /api/update / performAutoUpdate，以及 TUI 的 installUpdate。

5 *

6 * 解决的核心问题：当 wand 进程正在运行（systemd/launchd/nohup/直接前台都算）时，

7 * `npm install -g @co0ontty/wand@latest` 会把旧包目录 rename 成 `.wand-XXXXXX` 备份。

8 * 如果安装中途失败，这个备份目录会留下，之后每次 npm install 都会因为目标 dest 已存在

9 * 报 `ENOTEMPTY: directory not empty, rename ...`。

10 *

11 * 我们的策略：安装前备份当前全局包，补齐 npm 子进程 PATH，清掉

dist/server.jsView file

5Detached bundled service listener: dist/server.js launches a Node helper and exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener. L5: import { stat } from "node:fs/promises"; L6: import { createServer as createHttpServer } from "node:http"; L7: import { createServer as createHttpsServer } from "node:https"; L8: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L9: import os from "node:os"; ... L60: // ── Package info ── L61: const PKG_JSON = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path.join(RUNTIME_ROOT_DIR, "package.json"), "utf8")); L62: const PKG_NAME = PKG_JSON.name; ... L104: function isExternalAvatarSource(value) { L105: return /^(https?:|data:)/i.test(value); L106: } ... L376: const candidates = [];

High

Spawned Bundled Service Listener

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L5

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/server.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg

dist/cert.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 15

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cert.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/terminal-daemon-server.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/terminal-daemon-server.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/terminal-daemon-server.jsView on unpkg

dist/path-repair.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/path-repair.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/path-repair.jsView on unpkg

dist/provider-cli-updater.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/provider-cli-updater.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/provider-cli-updater.jsView on unpkg

dist/terminal-daemon-client.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/terminal-daemon-client.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/terminal-daemon-client.jsView on unpkg

dist/update-helper.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/update-helper.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/update-helper.jsView on unpkg

dist/git-quick-commit.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/git-quick-commit.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/git-quick-commit.jsView on unpkg

dist/server-file-routes.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/server-file-routes.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server-file-routes.jsView on unpkg

vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

25 flagged · loading source

dist/config.jsView file

80patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 80

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/config.jsView on unpkg · L80

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView file

3import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import path from "node:path";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView on unpkg · L3

221await mkdir(dataDir, { recursive: true }); L222: const child = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(vendorRoot, "server/index.mjs")], { L223: cwd: vendorRoot, L224: env: { L225: ...process.env, L226: CODEX_TASKBOARD_HOST: "127.0.0.1", ... L233: const handler = async (req, res) => { L234: const incoming = new URL(req.originalUrl, "http://127.0.0.1"); L235: const pathname = incoming.pathname.replace(/^\/taskboard/, "") || "/";

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView on unpkg · L221

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/taskboard-bridge.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView on unpkg

dist/git-utils.jsView file

34} L35: function gitExecAsyncOptions(cwd, opts) { L36: return {

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/git-utils.jsView on unpkg · L34

dist/tui/layout.jsView file

2import { stripAnsi } from "../pty-text-utils.js"; L3: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L4: // neo-blessed 是 CJS，没有匹配 @types/blessed 的 default export，统一当 any 用。

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/tui/layout.jsView on unpkg · L2

dist/password-manager.jsView file

1import crypto from "node:crypto"; L2: export const DEFAULT_BROWSER_EXTENSION_BASE_URL = "https://home.huniu.fun:8183"; L3: export const DEFAULT_PASSWORD_VAULT_ID = "personal"; ... L255: const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]); L256: return `${VAULT_CIPHER_PREFIX}${iv.toString("base64url")}.${cipher.getAuthTag().toString("base64url")}.${encrypted.toString("base64url")}`; L257: }

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/password-manager.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/tui/commands.jsView file

4Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/tui/commands.js L4: * 所有命令统一返回 CommandResult，UI 层负责把结果渲染到 toast / 弹窗 / 日志。 L5: * 命令本身不直接写 stdout / stderr —— TUI 模式下 stderr 已经被 log-bus 劫持。 L6: */ L7: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L8: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from "node:fs"; ... L39: stdio: "inherit", L40: env: process.env, L41: }); ... L107: export function openInBrowser(url) { L108: const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" L109: ? "open" ... L133: ok: false,

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/tui/commands.jsView on unpkg · L4

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/tui/commands.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/tui/commands.jsView on unpkg

4* 所有命令统一返回 CommandResult，UI 层负责把结果渲染到 toast / 弹窗 / 日志。 L5: * 命令本身不直接写 stdout / stderr —— TUI 模式下 stderr 已经被 log-bus 劫持。 L6: */ L7: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L8: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from "node:fs"; ... L39: stdio: "inherit", L40: env: process.env, L41: }); ... L107: export function openInBrowser(url) { L108: const cmd = process.platform === "darwin" L109: ? "open" ... L133: ok: false,

browser-extension/src/background.jsView file

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

browser-extension/src/background.jsView on unpkg

Critical

Browser Credential Phishing

Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.

browser-extension/src/background.js

dist/npm-update-utils.jsView file

13Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/npm[redacted] spawns dist/web-ui/content/scripts.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L13: */ L14: import { execFile, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L15: import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L26: const PACKAGE_BASENAME = "wand"; L27: const DEFAULT_NPM_BIN = process.platform === "win32" ? "npm.cmd" : "npm"; L28: const COMMON_UNIX_PATHS = ["/usr/local/sbin", "/usr/local/bin", "/usr/sbin", "/usr/bin", "/sbin", "/bin"]; ... L32: function npmBin() { L33: return process.env.WAND_NPM_BIN || DEFAULT_NPM_BIN; L34: } ... L78: try { L79: const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(npmBin(), ["view", getInstallSpecForChannel(channel), "version"], { timeout: timeoutMs, env: getChildEnv(), maxBuffer: INSTALL_MAX_BUFFER }); L8

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/npm-update-utils.jsView on unpkg · L13

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @co0ontty/wand@4.56.0 matchedPath = dist/npm[redacted] matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvMG9udHR5L3dhbmQ:4.56.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/npm-update-utils.jsView on unpkg

dist/server.jsView file

High

Spawned Bundled Service Listener

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L5

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg

dist/cert.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 15

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cert.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/terminal-daemon-server.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/terminal-daemon-server.jsView on unpkg

dist/path-repair.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/path-repair.jsView on unpkg

dist/provider-cli-updater.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/provider-cli-updater.jsView on unpkg

dist/terminal-daemon-client.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/terminal-daemon-client.jsView on unpkg

dist/update-helper.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/update-helper.jsView on unpkg

dist/git-quick-commit.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/git-quick-commit.jsView on unpkg

dist/server-file-routes.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server-file-routes.jsView on unpkg

vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

25 flagged

dist/config.jsView file

Lines 60-100javascript

60 if (process.platform === "win32") {

61 return process.env.COMSPEC || "cmd.exe";

62 }

63 try {

64 const loginShell = os.userInfo().shell?.trim();

65 if (loginShell)

66 return loginShell;

67 }

68 catch {

69 // userInfo() throws when the process has no passwd entry.

70 }

71 const envShell = process.env.SHELL?.trim();

72 if (envShell)

73 return envShell;

74 return process.platform === "darwin" ? "/bin/zsh" : "/bin/bash";

75}

76export const defaultConfig = () => ({

77 host: "127.0.0.1",

78 port: 8443,

79 https: false,

80 password: "change-me",

Medium

Secret Pattern

Package contains a possible secret pattern.

dist/config.jsView on unpkg · L80

81 defaultProvider: "claude",

82 defaultSessionKind: "structured",

83 defaultTaskWorktree: true,

84 // 非 root 启动时才有资格用 Claude 的 permission-bypass（root 会被 Claude CLI 拒绝），

85 // 所以这种环境下把默认执行模式抬到「托管」——开箱即得自动确认权限的全自主体验。

86 // root 启动则保守回落到「default」（托管在 root 下也只能降级成 acceptEdits）。

87 // 注意：defaultMode 是偏好字段，只存 SQLite、不写 config.json（见 stripPreferenceFields），

88 // 这里仅作为「用户从未在设置里显式选过模式」时的回落值——显式选择始终优先。

89 defaultMode: isRunningAsRoot() ? "default" : "managed",

90 shell: resolveDefaultShell(),

91 defaultCwd: process.cwd(),

92 startupCommands: [],

93 allowedCommandPrefixes: [],

94 shortcutLogMaxBytes: 10 * 1024 * 1024,

95 language: "",

96 android: defaultAndroidApkConfig(),

97 macos: defaultMacosDmgConfig(),

98 ios: defaultIosIpaConfig(),

99 cardDefaults: defaultCardExpandDefaults(),

100 defaultModel: "",

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1import { mkdir } from "node:fs/promises";

2import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";

3import { createServer } from "node:net";

4import { spawn } from

dist/git-utils.jsView file

Lines 14-54javascript

14 GIT_ASKPASS: "true",

15 GCM_INTERACTIVE: "never",

16 SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE: "never",

17 GIT_EDITOR: "true",

18 GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR:

dist/tui/layout.jsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1import { createRequire } from "node:module";

2import { stripAnsi } from "../pty-text-utils.js";

3const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);

dist/password-manager.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import crypto from "node:crypto";

2export const DEFAULT_BROWSER_EXTENSION_BASE_URL = "https://home.huniu.fun:8183";

3export const DEFAULT_PASSWORD_VAULT_ID = "personal"

dist/tui/commands.jsView file

Lines 1-24javascript

1/**

2 * TUI 运维操作命令集合。

3 *

4 * 所有命令统一返回 CommandResult，UI 层负责把结果渲染到 toast / 弹窗 / 日志。

5 * 命令本身不直接写 stdout / stderr —— TUI 模式下 stderr 已经被 log-bus 劫持。

6 */

7import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

8import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from

browser-extension/src/background.jsView file

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

browser-extension/src/background.jsView on unpkg

Critical

Browser Credential Phishing

Source appears to collect browser login credentials for exfiltration.

browser-extension/src/background.js

dist/npm-update-utils.jsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1/**

2 * npm 全局更新通用辅助。

3 *

4 * 共用于 server.ts 的 /api/update / performAutoUpdate，以及 TUI 的 installUpdate。

5 *

6 * 解决的核心问题：当 wand 进程正在运行（systemd/launchd/nohup/直接前台都算）时，

7 * `npm install -g @co0ontty/wand@latest` 会把旧包目录 rename 成 `.wand-XXXXXX` 备份。

8 * 如果安装中途失败，这个备份目录会留下，之后每次 npm install 都会因为目标 dest 已存在

9 * 报 `ENOTEMPTY: directory not empty, rename ...`。

10 *

11 * 我们的策略：安装前备份当前全局包，补齐 npm 子进程 PATH，清掉

dist/server.jsView file

High

Spawned Bundled Service Listener

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg · L5

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server.jsView on unpkg

dist/cert.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 15

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cert.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/terminal-daemon-server.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/terminal-daemon-server.jsView on unpkg

dist/path-repair.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/path-repair.jsView on unpkg

dist/provider-cli-updater.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/provider-cli-updater.jsView on unpkg

dist/terminal-daemon-client.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/terminal-daemon-client.jsView on unpkg

dist/update-helper.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/update-helper.jsView on unpkg

dist/git-quick-commit.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/git-quick-commit.jsView on unpkg

dist/server-file-routes.jsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/server-file-routes.jsView on unpkg

vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjsView file

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

vendor/codex-taskboard/server/ai-turn-owner.mjsView on unpkg

Lines 201-241javascript

201 }

202 catch {

203 reject(new Error("任务面板返回了无效数据。"));

204 }

205 });

206 });

207 request.on("error", reject);

208 request.end();

209 });

210}

211function rewriteTaskboardHtml(body) {

212 const html = body.toString("utf8");

213 const script = taskboardIntegrationScript();

214 const marker = html.toLowerCase().lastIndexOf("</head>");

215 return Buffer.from(marker >= 0 ? `${html.slice(0, marker)}${script}${html.slice(marker)}` : `${html}${

216}

217export async function startTaskboardBridge(configDir, storage, sessions, structured, fallbackCwd) {

218 const port = await freePort();

219 const vendorRoot = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../vendor/codex-taskboard");

220 const dataDir = path.join(configDir, "taskboard");

221 await mkdir(dataDir, { recursive: true });

222 const child = spawn(process.execPath, [path.join(vendorRoot, "server/index.mjs")], {

223 cwd: vendorRoot,

224 env: {

225 ...process.env,

226 CODEX_TASKBOARD_HOST: "127.0.0.1",

227 CODEX_TASKBOARD_PORT: String(port),

228 CODEX_TASKBOARD_DATA_DIR: dataDir,

229 },

230 stdio: "ignore",

231 });

232 await waitForReady(port, child);

233 const handler = async (req, res) => {

234 const incoming = new URL(req.originalUrl, "http://127.0.0.1");

235 const pathname = incoming.pathname.replace(/^\/taskboard/, "") || "/";

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/taskboard-bridge.jsView on unpkg · L221

236 const query = incoming.search;

237 const taskId = typeof incoming.searchParams.get("taskId") === "string" ? incoming.searchParams.get("taskId") ?? "" : "";

238 const sessionId = typeof req.headers["x-wand-session-id"] === "string" ? req.headers["x-wand-session-id"] : "";

239 if (storage && sessions && structured && pathname === "/api/wand/assign" && req.method === "POST") {

240 try {

241 const body = await readJsonBody(req);

@co0ontty/wand@4.57.0

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code