registry  /  @codeuxai/codeux  /  0.8.6

@codeuxai/codeux@0.8.6

Containerized environment for running and managing AI sub-agents

AI Security Review

scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is an AI-agent dashboard/MCP server that can run Docker, provider CLIs, local HTTP services, and credential login flows when the user starts and uses it.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs the codeux CLI and invokes dashboard/MCP or provider login actions
Impact
Expected local agent automation, credential setup, and network access for configured providers; no unconsented install/import-time execution found
Mechanism
user-invoked AI agent orchestration and Docker/provider CLI execution
Rationale
The high-risk primitives are package-aligned for a containerized AI-agent manager and are activated by user runtime/dashboard actions, not npm lifecycle or import-time behavior. Path validation, provider allowlisting, local-origin checks, and MCP auth reduce the scanner-reported combinations to expected functionality rather than concrete malware.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/server/terminal-routes.jsdist/config/app-config.jsdist/app/lifecycle/mcp-lifecycle-service.jsdist/utils/path-validator.jsdist/services/cli-docker-utils.js.code-ux/container/setup.sh~/.code-ux/credentials/<providerConfigId>~/.code-ux/credentials/<providerConfigId>-temp-<sessionId>
Network endpoints5
jules.googleapis.com/v1alphaclaude.ai/install.shopencode.ai/installantigravity.google/cli/install.shgithub.com/codeux-ai/codeux

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 82.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/server/terminal-routes.js can spawn Docker login containers and provider CLI install commands after dashboard API requests
  • .code-ux/container/setup.sh installs provider CLIs with npm/curl when a Code UX container is bootstrapped
  • dist/config/app-config.js enables an MCP HTTP gateway by default but requires/generates bearer auth for non-loopback binds
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall/preinstall lifecycle hooks; bin/main is dist/index.js
  • dist/index.js only loads config, dotenv, Docker host helper, then starts CodeUxServer on explicit CLI runtime
  • dist/server/terminal-routes.js restricts provider IDs and validates providerConfigId with assertSafePathSegment before fs.rm/fs.cp credential paths
  • dist/app/lifecycle/mcp-lifecycle-service.js rate-limits and bearer-authenticates MCP HTTP when authToken is configured
  • No source evidence of credential harvesting or exfiltration beyond user-initiated provider login/agent management flows
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedObfuscatedTelemetryUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 539 file(s), 9.31 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, antigravity.google, api.github.com, api.openai.com, belcour.github.io, blog.selfshadow.com, bugzilla.mozilla.org, byteblacksmith.com, casual-effects.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdn2.unrealengine.com, claude.ai, code.google.com, coding-intl.dashscope.aliyuncs.com, coding.dashscope.aliyuncs.com, company.atlassian.net, dashscope.aliyuncs.com, developer.mozilla.org, developers.google.com, drafts.csswg.org, dummy.com, en.wikipedia.org, example.com, filmicworlds.com, github.com, gitlab.com, google.github.io, googlechrome.github.io, graphicrants.blogspot.com, graphics.stanford.edu, gsap.com, hacks.mozilla.org, help.yahoo.com, html.spec.whatwg.org, huggingface.co, iolite-engine.com, jcgt.org, jules.googleapis.com, mmikk.github.io, modelviewer.dev, opencode.ai, r12a.github.io, react-dnd.github.io, reactjs.org, redux.js.org, sass-lang.com, schema.org, seblagarde.files.wordpress.com, stackoverflow.com, support.google.com
Oversized source lightweight scan
dashboard/dist/assets/editor.api2-KGjWAjnM.js3.46 MB file, sampled 256 KB
ChildProcessObfuscatedHighEntropyStringsMinified
dashboard/dist/assets/ts.worker-B0J26iPs.js6.58 MB file, sampled 256 KB
FilesystemNetworkChildProcess

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source
dist/server/terminal-routes.jsView file
486"mkdir -p /tmp/.npm-global", L487: "export NPM_CONFIG_PREFIX=/tmp/.npm-global", L488: "export PATH=/tmp/.npm-global/bin:$PATH", ... L493: "const fs = require('fs');", L494: "const { spawn } = require('child_process');", L495: "const args = process.argv.slice(2);", L496: "console.log('[DEBUG] xdg-open called with args:', args);", L497: "let url = args.find(arg => arg.startsWith('http://') || arg.startsWith('https://'));", L498: "if (url) {",
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.

dist/server/terminal-routes.jsView on unpkg · L486
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/server/code-ux-server.js -> dist/app/lifecycle/dashboard-lifecycle-service.js -> dist/server/dashboard-server.js -> dist/server/terminal-routes.js Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/server/terminal-routes.jsView on unpkg
1import { spawn } from "child_process"; L2: import * as fs from "fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/server/terminal-routes.jsView on unpkg · L1
264try { L265: const cp = await import("child_process"); L266: if (!cp || typeof cp.exec !== "function") {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/server/terminal-routes.jsView on unpkg · L264
1import { spawn } from "child_process"; L2: import * as fs from "fs/promises"; ... L6: import { isHostileBrowserOrigin } from "./dashboard-security.js"; L7: import * as net from "net"; L8: import { asyncRoute, syncRoute, toErrorResponse } from "./route-utils.js"; ... L47: function encodeFrame(payload) { L48: const message = Buffer.from(payload, "utf8"); L49: const length = message.length; ... L67: try { L68: socket.write(encodeFrame(JSON.stringify(payload))); L69: } ... L269: await new Promise((resolve) => {
Low
Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/server/terminal-routes.jsView on unpkg · L1
.code-ux/container/setup.shView file
path = .code-ux/container/setup.sh kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 6493 magicHex = [redacted]
High
Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

.code-ux/container/setup.shView on unpkg
path = .code-ux/container/setup.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 6493 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

.code-ux/container/setup.shView on unpkg
dashboard/dist/assets/editor.api2-KGjWAjnM.jsView file
path = dashboard/dist/assets/editor.api2-KGjWAjnM.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 3626875 magicHex = [redacted]
High
Oversized Source File

Package contains source files above the static scanner size ceiling.

dashboard/dist/assets/editor.api2-KGjWAjnM.jsView on unpkg

Findings

2 Critical4 High5 Medium7 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/server/terminal-routes.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/server/terminal-routes.js
HighChild Processdist/server/terminal-routes.js
HighShell
HighPayload In Excluded Dir.code-ux/container/setup.sh
HighOversized Source Filedashboard/dist/assets/editor.api2-KGjWAjnM.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/server/terminal-routes.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helper.code-ux/container/setup.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/server/terminal-routes.js
LowFilesystem
LowObfuscated
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowTelemetry
LowUrl Strings