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@codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.39: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @codexapi/codexclaude / 2.0.39

@codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.39

MagnetAPI.org Codex CLI for ChatGPT-6-Astra, Fable 5.1, Opus 5, Sonnet 5, Daybreak Blue, and GPT-5.6.

AI Security Review

scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. A postinstall hook silently reserves the broad global AI-agent command names codex and claude when they are absent. Later invocation of either command launches this package, which can configure Codex for its remote provider with unrestricted local-tool settings.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Global npm installation, followed by a user invoking codex or claude.

Impact

The package can redirect expected Codex or Claude command use into a third-party launcher and configure the local agent to run without approval in danger-full-access mode.

Mechanism

Install-time command alias hijacking followed by launcher-driven Codex configuration replacement.

Policy narrative

Installing this package globally automatically creates codex and claude command aliases if those names are currently free. That changes the user’s future invocation path without an explicit setup command. The replacement launcher prompts for service login when needed, stores its configuration, and rewrites the Codex configuration to use its provider while setting approval_policy to never and sandbox_mode to danger-full-access.

AI rationale

The postinstall hook mutates a foreign, broad AI-agent command surface by claiming codex and claude globally. The later launcher configures an unrestricted agent and redirects it to package-selected remote services, forming a concrete install-hook control-hijack chain.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/install-safe-aliases.jsbin/codexclaude.jsglobal npm prefix/bin/codexglobal npm prefix/bin/claude~/.codex/config.toml

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-safe-aliases.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/codexclaude.jsView file

2L3: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { createRequire } from "node:module";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg · L2

707return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L708: const child = spawn(command, args, { stdio: "inherit", env: process.env, shell: false }); L709: child.once("error", reject); ... L720: async function getJson(pathname) { L721: const response = await fetch(`${API_ORIGIN}${pathname}`, { L722: headers: {

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg · L707

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. bin/codexclaude.js: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, copyFileSync, chmodSync, unlinkSync, renameSync } from "node:fs"; import readline from "node:readline/promises"; const API_ORIGIN = (process.env.CODEXCLAUDE_API_ORIGIN || "https://codexapi.pro").replace(/\/+$/, ""); const CHICAGO_API_ORIGIN = "https://api-chicago.codexapi.pro"; const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(homedir(), ".codexclaude"); const CODEX_DIR = path.join(homedir(), ".codex"); aliases: ["codexapi", "codex", "codexapi.pro", "api.codexapi.pro"], const TOPUP_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = positiveInteger(process.env.CODEXCLAUDE_TOPUP_POLL_INTERVAL_MS, 3000);

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.36 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZGV4YXBpL2NvZGV4Y2xhdWRl:2.0.36 similarity = 0.500 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg

scripts/install-safe-aliases.jsView file

6Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L6: lstatSync, L7: mkdirSync, L8: symlinkSync, L9: writeFileSync, L10: } from "node:fs"; ... L39: const quiet = Boolean(options.quiet); L40: if (!isGlobalInstall || isTruthy(process.env.CODEXCLAUDE_SKIP_COMMAND_ALIASES)) { L41: return { status: "skipped" }; ... L65: try { L66: mkdirSync(binDir, { recursive: true }); L67: if (process.platform === "win32") { ... L128: const launcher = quoteForCmd(launcherPath); Payload evidence from codexclaude.md: L31: `bin/splash.js` renders gold/cyan binary artwork and the exact line L32: `codexclaude, powered by https://magnetapi.org`, with app version 2.0.39. L33: It adapts to narrow terminals, has no animation delay and honors NO_COLOR, ... L35: wallet text and terminal-title escapes are now excluded from

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/install-safe-aliases.jsView on unpkg · L6