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@codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.40: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @codexapi/codexclaude / 2.0.40

@codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.40

MagnetAPI.org Codex CLI for ChatGPT-6-Astra, Fable 5.1, Opus 5, Sonnet 5, Daybreak Blue, and GPT-5.6.

AI Security Review

scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. An npm postinstall hook can claim unoccupied global codex and claude command names for this package. This is an unconsented mutation of a broad AI-agent command surface.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Installing the package globally through npm activates postinstall.

Impact

Later invocations of either newly created command run this package's launcher instead of requiring the user to invoke codexclaude explicitly.

Mechanism

The lifecycle script checks for global installation, then symlinks its launcher into the global bin directory under codex and claude when those names are absent.

Policy narrative

A global npm installation automatically runs an installer that creates aliases named codex and claude if those commands are not already found. The aliases point to this package's launcher. Although existing commands are preserved and an opt-out exists, the mutation occurs before the user has expressly chosen these foreign command names.

AI rationale

The automatic postinstall hook modifies unoccupied global AI-agent command names, creating a concrete command-control hijack surface. Its guards reduce scope but do not provide prior consent for that lifecycle mutation.

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/install-safe-aliases.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-safe-aliases.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/codexclaude.jsView file

2L3: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { createRequire } from "node:module";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg · L2

707return await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L708: const child = spawn(command, args, { stdio: "inherit", env: process.env, shell: false }); L709: child.once("error", reject); ... L720: async function getJson(pathname) { L721: const response = await fetch(`${API_ORIGIN}${pathname}`, { L722: headers: {

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg · L707

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. bin/codexclaude.js: import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, copyFileSync, chmodSync, unlinkSync, renameSync } from "node:fs"; import readline from "node:readline/promises"; const API_ORIGIN = (process.env.CODEXCLAUDE_API_ORIGIN || "https://codexapi.pro").replace(/\/+$/, ""); const CHICAGO_API_ORIGIN = "https://api-chicago.codexapi.pro"; const CONFIG_DIR = path.join(homedir(), ".codexclaude"); const CODEX_DIR = path.join(homedir(), ".codex"); aliases: ["codexapi", "codex", "codexapi.pro", "api.codexapi.pro"], const TOPUP_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = positiveInteger(process.env.CODEXCLAUDE_TOPUP_POLL_INTERVAL_MS, 3000);

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.39 matchedPath = bin/codexclaude.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZGV4YXBpL2NvZGV4Y2xhdWRl:2.0.39 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = fb4be896f20243d3 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.39 matchedPath = bin/codexclaude.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZGV4YXBpL2NvZGV4Y2xhdWRl:2.0.39 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 4 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.36 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZGV4YXBpL2NvZGV4Y2xhdWRl:2.0.36 similarity = 0.500 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg

scripts/install-safe-aliases.jsView file

6Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L6: lstatSync, L7: mkdirSync, L8: symlinkSync, L9: writeFileSync, L10: } from "node:fs"; ... L39: const quiet = Boolean(options.quiet); L40: if (!isGlobalInstall || isTruthy(process.env.CODEXCLAUDE_SKIP_COMMAND_ALIASES)) { L41: return { status: "skipped" }; ... L65: try { L66: mkdirSync(binDir, { recursive: true }); L67: if (process.platform === "win32") { ... L128: const launcher = quoteForCmd(launcherPath); Payload evidence from codexclaude.md: L53: `bin/splash.js` renders gold/cyan binary artwork and the exact line L54: `codexclaude, powered by https://magnetapi.org`, with app version 2.0.39. L55: It adapts to narrow terminals, has no animation delay and honors NO_COLOR, ... L57: wallet text and terminal-title escapes are now excluded from

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

scripts/install-safe-aliases.jsView on unpkg · L6

bin/splash.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.39 matchedPath = bin/splash.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZGV4YXBpL2NvZGV4Y2xhdWRl:2.0.39 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/splash.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 1-38json

1{

2 "name": "@codexapi/codexclaude",

3 "version": "2.0.40",

4 "description": "MagnetAPI.org Codex CLI for ChatGPT-6-Astra, Fable 5.1, Opus 5, Sonnet 5, Daybreak Blue, and GPT-5.6.",

5 "license": "Apache-2.0",

6 "type": "module",

7 "bin": {

8 "codexclaude": "bin/codexclaude.js"

9 },

10 "files": [

11 "bin",

12 "scripts",

13 "README.md",

14 "CUSTOMIZATIONS.md",

15 "codexclaude.md"

16 ],

17 "scripts": {

18 "postinstall": "node scripts/install-safe-aliases.js",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L18

19 "test": "node --test test/*.test.js"

20 },

21 "engines": {

22 "node": ">=20"

23 },

24 "dependencies": {

25 "@iarna/toml": "2.2.5",

26 "@openai/codex": "0.157.0-alpha.7"

27 },

28 "publishConfig": {

29 "access": "public"

30 },

31 "keywords": [

32 "codex",

33 "claude",

34 "opus",

35 "codexapi",

36 "coding-cli"

37 ],

38 "repository": {

bin/codexclaude.jsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2

3import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

4import { createRequire } from "node:module";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/codexclaude.jsView on unpkg · L2

5import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, copyFileSync, chmodSync, unlinkSync, renameSync } from

scripts/install-safe-aliases.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2

3import {

4 chmodSync,

5 existsSync,

6 lstatSync,

7 mkdirSync,

8 symlinkSync,

9 writeFileSync,

10} from "node:fs";

bin/splash.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codexapi/codexclaude@2.0.39 matchedPath = bin/splash.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZGV4YXBpL2NvZGV4Y2xhdWRl:2.0.39 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/splash.jsView on unpkg