--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@codyswann/lisa/v/4.54.3" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@codyswann/lisa/v/4.54.3.md" package: "@codyswann/lisa" report_status: "published" title: "@codyswann/lisa@4.54.3 npm security report" verdict: "policy_finding" version: "4.54.3" --- # @codyswann/lisa@4.54.3 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. A dependency install can add, remove, or refresh agent capabilities without an explicit setup command from the consumer. - **Verdict:** AI-agent control-surface policy finding - **Product-default install policy:** Warn by default; block when configured - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 4.54.3 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This finding concerns changes to an AI agent's instructions or configuration without explicit user action. It does not by itself establish malware intent. The CLI warns by default and blocks when configured for this policy. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package automatically modifies the consumer project and installs AI-agent plugins. It can also alter user-wide Codex plugin state. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-08T22:02:13.052Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-08T22:03:48.772Z - **Download time:** 2539 ms - **Static scan time:** 25388 ms - **AI review time:** 67790 ms - **Total time:** 95720 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package automatically modifies the consumer project and installs AI-agent plugins. It can also alter user-wide Codex plugin state. - **Trigger:** npm package installation runs postinstall. - **Impact:** A dependency install can add, remove, or refresh agent capabilities without an explicit setup command from the consumer. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-claude-plugins.sh - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-08T22:03:48.772Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Automatic project-wide AI-agent configuration and plugin provisioning. - **Attack narrative:** The postinstall hook invokes a shell installer automatically. Outside CI, it runs the package CLI non-interactively on the consumer project, then installs Lisa and several unrelated Claude plugins in project scope. It refreshes marketplace state and removes legacy user-wide Codex registrations. The manifest also selects an older release of the same package as a runtime development dependency, allowing another lifecycle-enabled release to enter the installation path. This is an unconsented, broad AI-agent control-surface change initiated merely by installing a dependency. - **Rationale:** The package automatically provisions and mutates AI-agent control surfaces in the consuming project and user environment. Its self-dependency range increases lifecycle-chain risk, so this exceeds a user-invoked setup tool. - **Files touched:** package.json, .claude/settings.json, .claude/.lisa-plugins-synced, .claude/worktrees/\*, .safety-net.json, $HOME/.codex/.lisa-legacy-plugins-retired ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for policy risk:** The package has an automatic postinstall hook that runs the Claude-plugin installer., During dependency installation, the installer runs Lisa non-interactively against the consuming project root., The installer installs Lisa and third-party Claude plugins with project scope and refreshes its marketplace., The release declares an older range of itself as a runtime development dependency, creating a nested lifecycle supply-chain path., The lifecycle script also removes user-wide Codex plugins and writes a marker under the user's Codex directory. - **Evidence against:** The reviewed installer does not contain direct credential collection or HTTP upload code. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @codyswann/lisa@4.54.3. - Avoid installing @codyswann/lisa@4.54.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = bash ./scripts/install-claude-plugins.sh || true; node ./scripts/install-generated-artifact-merge-driver.mjs || true; [ ! -f tsconfig.json ] || tsc -p tsconfig.json || true ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = bash ./scripts/install-claude-plugins.sh || true; node ./scripts/install-generated-artifact-merge-driver.mjs || true; [ ! -f tsconfig.json ] || tsc -p tsconfig.json || true ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** harper-fabric/create-only/.github/workflows/deploy.yml - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```yaml patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 98 ``` ### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** harper-fabric/copy-overwrite/eslint.config.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L32: L33: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L34: const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); ``` ### 7. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 68.0% - **Path:** scripts/check-ui-demo-data.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source executes code through a VM context API. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L89: }); L90: process.stdout.write( L91: `[ui-demo-data] PASS: inspected ${inspection.audit.inspected} rendered values across ${inspection.audit.sections} sections\n` ``` ### 8. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 9. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 10. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 12. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 13. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** harper-fabric/create-only/scripts/zap-baseline.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = harper-fabric/create-only/scripts/zap-baseline.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 5104 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 14. High: Payload In Excluded Dir - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/skills/container-view-pattern/scripts/validate\_component.py - **Public source:** [View source]() Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```python path = plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/skills/container-view-pattern/scripts/validate_component.py kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 13103 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 16. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** all/copy-overwrite/scripts/check-conflict-markers.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 99 ``` ### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/doctor-coderabbit.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/doctor-coderabbit.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/setup-project.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/setup-project.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ui-automations-adapters.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/ui-automations-adapters.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ui-observability-checks.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/ui-observability-checks.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/update-cmd.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/update-cmd.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/core/kane-cli-process.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/core/kane-cli-process.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/core/kane-cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/core/kane-cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/standards/git-state.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/standards/git-state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/postinstall-trampoline.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/utils/postinstall-trampoline.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/lisa-test-run-runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/lisa-test-run-runtime.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ui-deploy-pipeline.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/cli/ui-deploy-pipeline.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/core/learnings-merge-driver-install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.54.2 matchedPath = dist/core/learnings-merge-driver-install.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.54.2 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 30. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 31. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 32. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 33. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/src/wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/src/wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 55 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 14 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 55 ### Published dependency entries - @ast-grep/cli ^0.40.4 (Dependency) - @commitlint/cli ^20.5.0 (Dependency) - @commitlint/config-conventional ^20.5.0 (Dependency) - @decimalturn/toml-patch ^1.1.1 (Dependency) - @eslint-community/eslint-plugin-eslint-comments ^4.5.0 (Dependency) - @eslint/eslintrc ^3.2.0 (Dependency) - @eslint/js ^9.39.0 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - @jest/globals ^30.0.0 (Dependency) - @jest/test-sequencer ^30.2.0 (Dependency) - @types/fs-extra ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - @types/jest ^30.0.0 (Dependency) - @types/lodash.merge ^4.6.0 (Dependency) - @types/node ^22.0.0 (Dependency) - @vitest/coverage-v8 ^4.1.9 (Dependency) - commander ^12.0.0 (Dependency) - esbuild-register ^3.6.0 (Dependency) - eslint ^9.39.0 (Dependency) - eslint-config-expo ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-config-prettier ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-import-resolver-typescript ^4.4.4 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-functional ^9.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-import ^2.32.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-jsdoc ^61.5.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y ^6.10.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-prettier ^5.5.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react ^7.37.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react-compiler ^19.1.0-rc.2 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react-hooks ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react-perf ^3.3.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-sonarjs ^4.0.3 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-tailwindcss ^3.18.0 (Dependency) - fs-extra ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - globals ^16.0.0 (Dependency) - husky ^8.0.0 (Dependency) - jest ^30.0.0 (Dependency) - jiti ^2.4.0 (Dependency) - js-yaml ^4.3.1 (Dependency) - jscodeshift 0.15.2 (Dependency) - jsonc-parser ^3.3.1 (Dependency) - knip ^5.0.0 (Dependency) - lint-staged ^16.2.7 (Dependency) - lodash.merge ^4.6.2 (Dependency) - minimatch ^10.2.5 (Dependency) - picocolors ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - prettier ^3.3.3 (Dependency) - semver ^7.8.1 (Dependency) - smol-toml ^1.6.1 (Dependency) - standard-version ^9.5.0 (Dependency) - ts-jest ^29.4.9 (Dependency) - ts-morph ^27.0.2 (Dependency) - tsx ^4.0.0 (Dependency) - typescript ^6.0.3 (Dependency) - typescript-eslint ^8.0.0 (Dependency) - vitest ^4.1.9 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @codyswann/lisa - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 4.54.3 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-08T21:59:23.013Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T05:23:06.191Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-09T16:20:22.617Z - **Known versions:** 521 - **Latest version:** 4.73.4 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Claude Code governance framework that applies guardrails, guidance, and automated enforcement to projects - **Author:** Cody Swann - **Keywords:** claude, claude-code, governance, linting, configuration - **Runtime engines:** npm: please-use-bun, yarn: please-use-bun, pnpm: please-use-bun, bun: 1.3.8, node: 22.21.1 - **Artifact files:** 7361 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 54,453,174 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()