--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@codyswann/lisa/v/4.55.25" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@codyswann/lisa/v/4.55.25.md" package: "@codyswann/lisa" report_status: "published" title: "@codyswann/lisa@4.55.25 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "4.55.25" --- # @codyswann/lisa@4.55.25 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — A dependency install can alter consumer package scripts, project agent configuration, and future install behavior without an explicit user command. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse - **Selected version:** 4.55.25 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Installing the package automatically modifies the consumer project and its Claude Code plugin state. It also persists a Lisa command in the consumer's postinstall and can launch a detached reconciliation process. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-13T00:42:52.835Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-13T00:44:24.496Z - **Download time:** 1763 ms - **Static scan time:** 20591 ms - **AI review time:** 69304 ms - **Total time:** 91661 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package automatically modifies the consumer project and its Claude Code plugin state. It also persists a Lisa command in the consumer's postinstall and can launch a detached reconciliation process. - **Trigger:** npm-compatible installation of the package outside CI. - **Impact:** A dependency install can alter consumer package scripts, project agent configuration, and future install behavior without an explicit user command. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-claude-plugins.sh, dist/migrations/ensure-lisa-postinstall.js, dist/utils/postinstall-trampoline.js, dist/core/lisa.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-13T00:44:24.496Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Lifecycle-driven consumer-project mutation, agent plugin installation, and detached re-execution. - **Attack narrative:** The package's postinstall targets the parent project, applies its templates, installs project-scoped Claude plugins, and can add a Lisa invocation to the consumer's own postinstall. When package-manager writes would undo those changes, it schedules a detached child to apply them again after installation. This creates unconsented persistence and broad AI-agent control-surface mutation in a consuming project. - **Rationale:** This is concrete automatic install-hook abuse: it modifies a foreign consumer's package lifecycle and agent tooling, then retries changes after the installer exits. The absence of observed secret theft does not neutralize the persistent control-surface mutation. - **Files touched:** consumer package.json, consumer .claude/settings.json, consumer .claude/.lisa-plugins-synced ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** Its automatic postinstall runs a script that resolves the consuming project as its target., The install script non-interactively runs Lisa against the consumer project and installs Claude plugins., A migration persists Lisa into the consumer's package.json postinstall hook., It detaches a child process to re-run reconciliation after the package manager exits. - **Evidence against:** No credential harvesting or data exfiltration was found in the inspected install path., The self-reference is a devDependency, not a runtime self-dependency. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @codyswann/lisa@4.55.25. - Avoid installing @codyswann/lisa@4.55.25. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = bash ./scripts/install-claude-plugins.sh || true; node ./scripts/install-generated-artifact-merge-driver.mjs || true; [ ! -f tsconfig.json ] || tsc -p tsconfig.json || true ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = bash ./scripts/install-claude-plugins.sh || true; node ./scripts/install-generated-artifact-merge-driver.mjs || true; [ ! -f tsconfig.json ] || tsc -p tsconfig.json || true ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** harper-fabric/create-only/.github/workflows/deploy.yml - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```yaml patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 105 ``` ### 6. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/migrations/untrack-codex-marketplace.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L17: * L18: * `child_process` is dynamically imported (matching `src/core/lisa.ts`) so the L19: * static security lint for command paths is not tripped; every command passed ``` ### 7. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/core/git-service.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L4: import * as fse from "fs-extra"; L5: const execAsync = promisify(exec); L6: /** ``` ### 8. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** harper-fabric/copy-overwrite/eslint.config.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript L32: L33: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L34: const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); ``` ### 9. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 68.0% - **Path:** scripts/check-ui-demo-data.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source executes code through a VM context API. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L89: }); L90: process.stdout.write( L91: `[ui-demo-data] PASS: inspected ${inspection.audit.inspected} rendered values across ${inspection.audit.sections} sections\n` ``` ### 10. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 11. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 12. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-cursor/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/materialize-secrets.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L2: /** L3: * Write the provider"s current view to the two files a materializing surface\n * reads.\n *\n * Only surfaces that cannot read through live use this. A remote agent\n * container p... L4: * run matched the same unowned marker and stripped the first tenant"s block.\n * @param {string} text File contents.\n * @param {string} family Frozen family identifier.\n * @param... ... L98: * variables, and sourced LAST so they win over anything the host injected — L99: * environment variables outrank profile files in AWS"s credential chain, which\n * is the whole reason a valid credential was being ignored.\n *\n * Guarded on the file existing, s... L100: * either. ... L106: const { L107: home = process.env.HOME || homedir(), L108: owner, ``` ### 13. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 14. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/remote-env-cmd.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L16: * L17: * npx -y `@codyswann/lisa@latest` remote-env --phase=secrets L18: * ... L23: */ L24: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L25: import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; ``` ### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 16. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 17. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** harper-fabric/create-only/scripts/zap-baseline.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = harper-fabric/create-only/scripts/zap-baseline.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 5104 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 18. High: Payload In Excluded Dir - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/skills/container-view-pattern/scripts/validate\_component.py - **Public source:** [View source]() Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```python path = plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/skills/container-view-pattern/scripts/validate_component.py kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 13103 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 19. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 20. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** all/copy-overwrite/scripts/check-conflict-markers.mjs\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 100 ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/doctor-coderabbit.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/doctor-coderabbit.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/setup-project.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/setup-project.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ui-automations-adapters.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/ui-automations-adapters.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ui-observability-checks.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/ui-observability-checks.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/update-cmd.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/update-cmd.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/core/kane-cli-process.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/core/kane-cli-process.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/core/kane-cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/core/kane-cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/standards/git-state.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/standards/git-state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/utils/postinstall-trampoline.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/utils/postinstall-trampoline.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 30. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/lisa-test-run-runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/lisa-test-run-runtime.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 31. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/ui-deploy-pipeline.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/cli/ui-deploy-pipeline.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 32. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/core/learnings-merge-driver-install.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @codyswann/lisa@4.55.24 matchedPath = dist/core/learnings-merge-driver-install.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvZHlzd2Fubi9saXNh:4.55.24 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 33. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 34. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 35. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 36. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ### 37. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** plugins/src/wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in plugins/src/wiki/scripts/wiki-safety.mjs Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 14 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 55 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 15 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 55 ### Published dependency entries - @ast-grep/cli ^0.40.4 (Dependency) - @commitlint/cli ^20.5.0 (Dependency) - @commitlint/config-conventional ^20.5.0 (Dependency) - @decimalturn/toml-patch ^1.1.1 (Dependency) - @eslint-community/eslint-plugin-eslint-comments ^4.5.0 (Dependency) - @eslint/eslintrc ^3.2.0 (Dependency) - @eslint/js ^9.39.0 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - @jest/globals ^30.0.0 (Dependency) - @jest/test-sequencer ^30.2.0 (Dependency) - @types/fs-extra ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - @types/jest ^30.0.0 (Dependency) - @types/lodash.merge ^4.6.0 (Dependency) - @types/node ^22.0.0 (Dependency) - @vitest/coverage-v8 ^4.1.9 (Dependency) - commander ^12.0.0 (Dependency) - esbuild-register ^3.6.0 (Dependency) - eslint ^9.39.0 (Dependency) - eslint-config-expo ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-config-prettier ^10.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-import-resolver-typescript ^4.4.4 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-functional ^9.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-import ^2.32.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-jsdoc ^61.5.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y ^6.10.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-prettier ^5.5.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react ^7.37.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react-compiler ^19.1.0-rc.2 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react-hooks ^7.0.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-react-perf ^3.3.0 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-sonarjs ^4.0.3 (Dependency) - eslint-plugin-tailwindcss ^3.18.0 (Dependency) - fs-extra ^11.0.0 (Dependency) - globals ^16.0.0 (Dependency) - husky ^8.0.0 (Dependency) - jest ^30.0.0 (Dependency) - jiti ^2.4.0 (Dependency) - js-yaml ^4.3.1 (Dependency) - jscodeshift 0.15.2 (Dependency) - jsonc-parser ^3.3.1 (Dependency) - knip ^5.0.0 (Dependency) - lint-staged ^16.2.7 (Dependency) - lodash.merge ^4.6.2 (Dependency) - minimatch ^10.2.5 (Dependency) - picocolors ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - prettier ^3.3.3 (Dependency) - semver ^7.8.1 (Dependency) - smol-toml 1.7.1 (Dependency) - standard-version ^9.5.0 (Dependency) - ts-jest ^29.4.9 (Dependency) - ts-morph ^27.0.2 (Dependency) - tsx ^4.0.0 (Dependency) - typescript ^6.0.3 (Dependency) - typescript-eslint ^8.0.0 (Dependency) - vitest ^4.1.9 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @codyswann/lisa - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 4.55.25 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-13T00:39:46.847Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T05:23:06.191Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-08T21:55:41.827Z - **Known versions:** 516 - **Latest version:** 4.72.6 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Claude Code governance framework that applies guardrails, guidance, and automated enforcement to projects - **Author:** Cody Swann - **Keywords:** claude, claude-code, governance, linting, configuration - **Runtime engines:** npm: please-use-bun, yarn: please-use-bun, pnpm: please-use-bun, bun: 1.3.8, node: 22.21.1 - **Artifact files:** 7415 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 56,415,240 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()