registry  /  @coldiq/mcp  /  0.3.23

@coldiq/mcp@0.3.23

An [MCP (Model Context Protocol)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server that exposes ColdIQ's B2B data marketplace to AI assistants. Connect it to Claude or any MCP-compatible client to search companies, find and enrich contacts, verify emails, track sa

AI Security Review

scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. Runtime network access is package-aligned for a ColdIQ MCP server and requires user configuration/API key.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs the coldiq-mcp bin or an MCP client invokes registered tools.
Impact
Expected B2B data/search/enrichment operations; no install-time persistence, exfiltration, or foreign agent-control mutation found.
Mechanism
MCP tool server forwarding user-requested actions to ColdIQ API and optional ColdIQ skills URLs
Rationale
Static inspection shows an MCP server for ColdIQ tools with package-aligned API calls and user-invoked skill loading, not lifecycle hijacking or covert data theft. The scanner's critical test finding is explained by test-only fetch mocking, not production behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonsrc/index.tssrc/client.tssrc/skills.tssrc/executor.tssrc/verb-client.tssrc/tools/load-skill.tssrc/tools/list-skills.tstests/skills.test.tsREADME.md
Network endpoints2
api.coldiq.comraw.githubusercontent.com/Cold-IQ/coldiq-marketplace-skills/main/.well-known/agent-skills/index.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 93.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
    Evidence against
    • package.json has no install/postinstall/preinstall hooks; only prepublishOnly build script
    • src/index.ts only starts an MCP stdio server and registers ColdIQ tools
    • src/client.ts sends requests to configured ColdIQ API with COLDIQ_API_KEY; no credential harvesting beyond required auth header
    • src/skills.ts fetches a ColdIQ skills index/body only when list_skill/load_skill tools are invoked
    • rg found no source writes to .mcp.json, Claude/Codex/Cursor settings, shell startup files, or VCS hooks
    • tests/skills.test.ts mutates global fetch only inside Vitest mocks, explaining scanner tampering noise
    Behavioral surface
    Source
    EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
    Supply chain
    HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
    Manifest
    NoLicense
    scanned 160 file(s), 1.07 MB of source, external domains: agfundernews.com, api.coldiq.com, api.companyenrich.com, api.peopledatalabs.com, apiv2.leadsfactory.io, app.fullenrich.com, apple.com, coldiq.com, example.com, fintech.global, images.trysignalbase.com, linkedin.com, maps.google.com, microsoft.com, mistral.ai, raw.example, raw.githubusercontent.com, reddit.com, schemas.agentskills.io, sumble.com, techcrunch.com, test-api.local, twitter.com, wework.com, www.coldiq.com, www.google.com, www.linkedin.com, www.reddit.com

    Source & flagged code

    1 flagged · loading source
    tests/skills.test.ts#virtual:normalized:round1View file
    44afterEach(() => { L45: globalThis.fetch = originalFetch L46: vi.restoreAllMocks() ... L49: it('listSkills returns name + description from the index', async () => { L50: globalThis.fetch = mockFetch({ L51: 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Cold-IQ/coldiq-marketplace-skills/main/.well-known/agent-skills/index.json': { L52: body: JSON.stringify(INDEX), L53: },
    Critical
    Builtin Api Tampering Exfiltration

    Source mutates builtin networking, serialization, module-loading, or filesystem APIs while forwarding data to an external endpoint.

    tests/skills.test.ts#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L44

    Findings

    1 Critical2 Medium6 Low
    CriticalBuiltin Api Tampering Exfiltrationtests/skills.test.ts#virtual:normalized:round1
    MediumNetwork
    MediumEnvironment Vars
    LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
    LowScripts Present
    LowFilesystem
    LowHigh Entropy Strings
    LowUrl Strings
    LowNo License