registry  /  @coldiq/mcp  /  0.3.25

@coldiq/mcp@0.3.25

An [MCP (Model Context Protocol)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server that exposes ColdIQ's B2B data marketplace to AI assistants. Connect it to Claude or any MCP-compatible client to search companies, find and enrich contacts, verify emails, track sa

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. Runtime network use is the advertised MCP/API function and requires a user-provided ColdIQ API key.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User starts the MCP server and invokes its tools.
Impact
Expected B2B data lookup and skill guide retrieval; no unauthorized persistence, exfiltration, or install-time mutation found.
Mechanism
MCP tool server forwarding user inputs to ColdIQ API and optional skills catalog fetch.
Rationale
Static inspection shows an advertised ColdIQ MCP server with user-invoked API calls and optional first-party skill loading, not install-time mutation or covert data theft. The scanner's critical finding comes from test mock fetch mutation, not runtime exfiltration behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonsrc/index.tssrc/client.tssrc/skills.tssrc/tools/call-endpoint.tssrc/tools/load-skill.tssrc/tools/list-skills.tstests/skills.test.tsREADME.md
Network endpoints2
api.coldiq.comraw.githubusercontent.com/Cold-IQ/coldiq-marketplace-skills/main/.well-known/agent-skills/index.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
    Evidence against
    • package.json has only prepublishOnly build script; no preinstall/install/postinstall hook.
    • src/index.ts registers MCP tools and connects stdio; no file writes or agent config mutation.
    • src/client.ts requires COLDIQ_API_KEY and sends user-invoked tool requests to package-aligned https://api.coldiq.com/v1 paths.
    • src/skills.ts fetches a first-party GitHub raw skills index/body only when list_skills/load_skill are invoked.
    • tests/skills.test.ts mutates globalThis.fetch only inside Vitest mocks; scanner tampering hint is test-only.
    • rg found no child_process, eval/vm/Function, native binary loading, persistence, or credential/file harvesting in src/dist.
    Behavioral surface
    Source
    EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
    Supply chain
    HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
    Manifest
    NoLicense
    scanned 169 file(s), 1.09 MB of source, external domains: agfundernews.com, api.coldiq.com, api.companyenrich.com, api.peopledatalabs.com, apiv2.leadsfactory.io, app.fullenrich.com, apple.com, coldiq.com, example.com, fintech.global, images.trysignalbase.com, linkedin.com, maps.google.com, microsoft.com, mistral.ai, raw.example, raw.githubusercontent.com, reddit.com, schemas.agentskills.io, sumble.com, techcrunch.com, test-api.local, twitter.com, wework.com, www.coldiq.com, www.google.com, www.linkedin.com, www.reddit.com

    Source & flagged code

    1 flagged · loading source
    tests/skills.test.ts#virtual:normalized:round1View file
    44afterEach(() => { L45: globalThis.fetch = originalFetch L46: vi.restoreAllMocks() ... L49: it('listSkills returns name + description from the index', async () => { L50: globalThis.fetch = mockFetch({ L51: 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Cold-IQ/coldiq-marketplace-skills/main/.well-known/agent-skills/index.json': { L52: body: JSON.stringify(INDEX), L53: },
    Critical
    Builtin Api Tampering Exfiltration

    Source mutates builtin networking, serialization, module-loading, or filesystem APIs while forwarding data to an external endpoint.

    tests/skills.test.ts#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L44

    Findings

    1 Critical2 Medium6 Low
    CriticalBuiltin Api Tampering Exfiltrationtests/skills.test.ts#virtual:normalized:round1
    MediumNetwork
    MediumEnvironment Vars
    LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
    LowScripts Present
    LowFilesystem
    LowHigh Entropy Strings
    LowUrl Strings
    LowNo License