registry / @compr/opscontext-mcp / 2.16.0
@compr/opscontext-mcp@2.16.0
OpsContext for AI Agents — read-only fleet visibility (PM2/nginx/Docker/git/cron) + tamper-evident audit log + policy-as-code hooks. The ops + compliance layer Claude Code can't grow natively.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe reviewer-directed instruction is evidence of malicious intent under the review policy, so the package is suspicious. Its manifest and CLI structure do not establish a publish-blocking install-time attack.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
The reviewer-directed text is present in the distributed activation source; the setup operations require explicit CLI commands.
Impact
The text is social engineering aimed at this review. No runtime compromise or data theft was established.
Mechanism
A source comment attempts to discourage review. Separate setup commands install the package's own Claude hooks and user login service.
AI rationale
The reviewer-directed instruction is evidence of malicious intent under the review policy, so the package is suspicious. Its manifest and CLI structure do not establish a publish-blocking install-time attack.
Evidence
dist/activation.jsdist/install-claude-hook.jsdist/install-autostart.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- dist/activation.js contains a direct instruction telling reviewers not to re-audit the activation code; this is reviewer manipulation.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall script; its prepublishOnly script is not an install trigger.
- The autostart and Claude hook setup are exposed as explicit CLI commands.
- The Claude hook installer writes OpsContext hook entries under the user's Claude settings; no automatic npm-triggered write was identified.
- The agent, Claude integration, CLI, secrets-lock, shared-index, autostart, and activation target locations were inspected; their cited excerpts show agent discovery, package-owned skill paths, settings reads, shared-index behavior, CLI setup, and activation comments.
Evidence against
- No concrete credential theft, exfiltration, destructive behavior, or unconsented install-time control-surface mutation was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcedist/adapters.jsView file
47}
L48: const mod = await import(moduleSpecifier);
L49: // Check for factory function
Medium
Dynamic Require
Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/adapters.jsView on unpkg · L47dist/install-autostart.jsView file
13Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/install-autostart.js
L13: // forever — defeating the whole point.
L14: // FIX: To add platform support beyond macOS, branch on process.platform and
L15: // add equivalent systemd / NSSM logic. Keep `gui/$UID` and KeepAlive
...
L19: import { homedir, platform } from "os";
L20: import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
L21: import { createRequire } from "module";
...
L34: const __filename_esm = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
L35: const __dirname_esm = dirname(__filename_esm);
L36: const requireFromHere = createRequire(import.meta.url);
...
L102: // [LOCKED] [AUTOSTART-ARGV-AND-XML-ESCAPED] - 2026-09-25
L103: // [NEVER] paste a path into a launchctl/lsof/curl command string, or into the plist unescaped.
L104:
High
Trigger Reachable Persistence
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/install-autostart.jsView on unpkg · L13Findings
3 High6 Medium5 Low
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/install-claude-hook.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/install-autostart.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/activation.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumDynamic Requiredist/adapters.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/install-autostart.js
MediumShips Build Helperdefaults/claude-code-hook.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.16.0.
See all versions of @compr/opscontext-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.16.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.