--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@compr/opscontext-mcp/v/2.4.1" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@compr/opscontext-mcp/v/2.4.1.md" package: "@compr/opscontext-mcp" report_status: "published" title: "@compr/opscontext-mcp@2.4.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "2.4.1" --- # @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.4.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 15 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Remote Code Execution - **Selected version:** 2.4.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package is not conclusively malicious, but its activation flow executes opaque server-delivered JavaScript that cannot be audited from the npm package. This is a concrete remote-code-execution risk and should be warned rather than published as clean. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 96.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-26T21:18:52.917Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-26T21:19:57.161Z - **Download time:** 501 ms - **Static scan time:** 1624 ms - **AI review time:** 62117 ms - **Total time:** 64244 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** An explicit activation command downloads opaque premium code from the vendor, decrypts it, saves it in the user home directory, and executes it through dynamic import. The reviewed package cannot establish what that later-delivered code does. - **Trigger:** The user runs the activate CLI command with a license key and email. - **Impact:** A compromised or malicious activation service can execute arbitrary code in the activating user's context. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/activation.js, dist/cli.js, dist/install-claude-hook.js, dist/install-autostart.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-26T21:19:57.161Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Remote encrypted module delivery followed by local dynamic import. - **Rationale:** The package is not conclusively malicious, but its activation flow executes opaque server-delivered JavaScript that cannot be audited from the npm package. This is a concrete remote-code-execution risk and should be warned rather than published as clean. - **Files touched:** ~/.contextengine/delta/\*.mjs, ~/.contextengine/delta/manifest.json - **Network endpoints:** https://api.compr.ch/contextengine ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Critical Vulnerability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** User activation posts license and machine details to the vendor API., The activation response supplies encrypted modules that are decrypted and written locally., The package dynamically imports those server-supplied modules without a package-embedded signature check. - **Evidence against:** The manifest has no npm install lifecycle hook., Activation requires an explicit CLI command with a license key and email., Claude hook and autostart changes are reached only through explicit CLI commands. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.4.1. - Review the evidence and your use of @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.4.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/adapters.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L46: } L47: const mod = await import(moduleSpecifier); L48: // Check for factory function ``` ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/install-autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: // forever — defeating the whole point. L14: // FIX: To add platform support beyond macOS, branch on process.platform and L15: // add equivalent systemd / NSSM logic. Keep `gui/$UID` and KeepAlive ... L19: import { homedir, platform } from "os"; L20: import { execSync } from "child_process"; L21: import { createRequire } from "module"; ... L34: const __filename_esm = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); L35: const __dirname_esm = dirname(__filename_esm); L36: const requireFromHere = createRequire(import.meta.url); ... L126: StandardOutPath L127: ${join(LOG_DIR, "mcp-stdout.log")} L128: ``` ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/activation.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. dist/activation.js: import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, unlinkSync } from "fs"; const ACTIVATION_API_BASE = process.env.CONTEXTENGINE_API || "https://api.compr.ch/contextengine"; `Reactivate at https://api.compr.ch/contextengine/pricing if this surprises you.`); writeFileSync(LICENSE_FILE, JSON.stringify(license, null, 2)); writeFileSync(join(DELTA_DIR, `${mod.name}.mjs`), content); writeFileSync(join(DELTA_DIR, "manifest.json"), JSON.stringify({ `Get a license: https://api.compr.ch/contextengine/pricing\n\n` + ``` ### 9. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/install-claude-hook.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. import { existssync, readfilesync, writefilesync, copyfilesync, chmodsync, mkdirsync } from "fs"; import { join } from "path"; import { homedir } from "os"; const claude_dir = join(homedir(), ".claude"); const settings_file = join(claude_dir, "settings.json"); const hooks_dir = join(claude_dir, "hooks"); const hook_script = join(hooks_dir, "opscontext-emit.sh"); const event_kinds = ["userpromptsubmit", "posttooluse", "sessionstart"]; function readsettings() { if (!existssync(settings_file)) return {}; try { return json.parse(readfilesync(settings_file, "utf-8")); } catch (err) { throw new error(`${settings_file} is not valid json — refusin ``` ### 10. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/install-autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/install-autostart.js L13: // forever — defeating the whole point. L14: // FIX: To add platform support beyond macOS, branch on process.platform and L15: // add equivalent systemd / NSSM logic. Keep `gui/$UID` and KeepAlive ... L19: import { homedir, platform } from "os"; L20: import { execSync } from "child_process"; L21: import { createRequire } from "module"; ... L34: const __filename_esm = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); L35: const __dirname_esm = dirname(__filename_esm); L36: const requireFromHere = createRequire(import.meta.url); ... L126: StandardOutPath L127: ${join(LOG_DIR, "mcp-stdout.log")} L128: ``` ### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 12. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 13. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** defaults/claude-code-hook.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = defaults/claude-code-hook.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3337 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 15. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.4.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvbXByL29wc2NvbnRleHQtbWNw:2.4.0 similarity = 0.871 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 2 - **Optional dependencies:** 1 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 5 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3 ### Published dependency entries - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.26.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency) - @huggingface/transformers ^3.8.1 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @compr/opscontext-mcp - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 2.4.1 - **License:** BSL-1.1 - **Version published:** 2026-08-16T15:23:46.761Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-15T04:34:32.809Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-16T19:09:41.396Z - **Known versions:** 21 - **Latest version:** 2.19.2 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** OpsContext for AI Agents — read-only fleet visibility (PM2/nginx/Docker/git/cron) + tamper-evident audit log + policy-as-code hooks. The ops + compliance layer Claude Code can't grow natively. - **Author:** PROD LLC - **Maintainers:** compr - **Keywords:** mcp, model-context-protocol, claude-code, claude, cursor, copilot, ai-agents, ops, observability, audit-log, compliance, soc2 - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 65 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 754,265 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]()