--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@compr/opscontext-mcp/v/2.8.3" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@compr/opscontext-mcp/v/2.8.3.md" package: "@compr/opscontext-mcp" report_status: "published" title: "@compr/opscontext-mcp@2.8.3 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "2.8.3" --- # @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.8.3 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse - **Selected version:** 2.8.3 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The explicit Claude hook setup is a concrete agent configuration capability, so this warrants a warning. The package has no npm install lifecycle trigger for that setup, and the inspected sources do not establish a publish-blocking attack. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-11T07:04:03.720Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-11T07:04:43.442Z - **Download time:** 760 ms - **Static scan time:** 1648 ms - **AI review time:** 37313 ms - **Total time:** 39722 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The package provides an explicit command that installs Claude Code hooks and changes the user's Claude settings. This is a guarded agent configuration capability; no install-time attack was identified. - **Trigger:** A user invokes the install-claude-hook CLI command. - **Impact:** The hooks can observe Claude session prompts and tool events and run a session gate. - **Evidence paths:** dist/cli.js, dist/install-claude-hook.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-11T07:04:43.442Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The command copies a hook script into the user's Claude hooks directory and adds hook entries to settings.json. - **Rationale:** The explicit Claude hook setup is a concrete agent configuration capability, so this warrants a warning. The package has no npm install lifecycle trigger for that setup, and the inspected sources do not establish a publish-blocking attack. - **Files touched:** dist/cli.js, dist/install-claude-hook.js, package.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The manifest defines only a prepublishOnly lifecycle script; the flagged setup is not wired to npm install., The CLI exposes Claude hook installation as an explicit command., That command copies a hook script into the user's Claude hooks directory and updates settings.json., The installer adds hooks for prompt submission, tool use, and session start., The activation source contains a comment instructing reviewers not to re-audit it, which is reviewer-directed manipulation. - **Evidence against:** The hook setup runs through an explicit CLI command rather than an npm install hook., The installer backs up settings.json and deduplicates existing hook registrations. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.8.3. - Review the evidence and your use of @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.8.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/adapters.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L46: } L47: const mod = await import(moduleSpecifier); L48: // Check for factory function ``` ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/install-autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L13: // forever — defeating the whole point. L14: // FIX: To add platform support beyond macOS, branch on process.platform and L15: // add equivalent systemd / NSSM logic. Keep `gui/$UID` and KeepAlive ... L19: import { homedir, platform } from "os"; L20: import { execSync } from "child_process"; L21: import { createRequire } from "module"; ... L34: const __filename_esm = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); L35: const __dirname_esm = dirname(__filename_esm); L36: const requireFromHere = createRequire(import.meta.url); ... L101: // was itself run with it (an explicit choice, not a default). L102: export function buildPlist(nodePath, entryPath, nodeBinDir, env = process.env) { L103: // OPSCONTEXT_DAEMON tells the server it has no MCP client on stdin and must stay alive on its ``` ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/install-claude-hook.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. import { existssync, readfilesync, writefilesync, copyfilesync, chmodsync, mkdirsync } from "fs"; import { join, dirname } from "path"; import { homedir } from "os"; import { fileurltopath } from "url"; import { execsync } from "child_process"; const __dirname_esm = dirname(fileurltopath(import.meta.url)); const claude_dir = jo ``` ### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/install-autostart.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/install-autostart.js L13: // forever — defeating the whole point. L14: // FIX: To add platform support beyond macOS, branch on process.platform and L15: // add equivalent systemd / NSSM logic. Keep `gui/$UID` and KeepAlive ... L19: import { homedir, platform } from "os"; L20: import { execSync } from "child_process"; L21: import { createRequire } from "module"; ... L34: const __filename_esm = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); L35: const __dirname_esm = dirname(__filename_esm); L36: const requireFromHere = createRequire(import.meta.url); ... L101: // was itself run with it (an explicit choice, not a default). L102: export function buildPlist(nodePath, entryPath, nodeBinDir, env = process.env) { L103: // OPSCON ``` ### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 11. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 12. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** defaults/claude-code-hook.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = defaults/claude-code-hook.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3337 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/activation.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 6 ``` ### 15. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/agents.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @compr/opscontext-mcp@2.8.2 matchedIdentity = npm:QGNvbXByL29wc2NvbnRleHQtbWNw:2.8.2 similarity = 0.881 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 2 - **Optional dependencies:** 1 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 5 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3 ### Published dependency entries - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.26.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.3.6 (Dependency) - @huggingface/transformers ^3.8.1 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @compr/opscontext-mcp - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 2.8.3 - **License:** BSL-1.1 - **Version published:** 2026-09-16T20:31:07.061Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-15T04:34:32.809Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-16T19:09:41.396Z - **Known versions:** 21 - **Latest version:** 2.19.2 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** OpsContext for AI Agents — read-only fleet visibility (PM2/nginx/Docker/git/cron) + tamper-evident audit log + policy-as-code hooks. The ops + compliance layer Claude Code can't grow natively. - **Author:** PROD LLC - **Maintainers:** compr - **Keywords:** mcp, model-context-protocol, claude-code, claude, cursor, copilot, ai-agents, ops, observability, audit-log, compliance, soc2 - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.19.0 - **Artifact files:** 87 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,025,510 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]()