--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@conceptcraft/mindframes/v/0.3.15" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@conceptcraft/mindframes/v/0.3.15.md" package: "@conceptcraft/mindframes" report_status: "published" title: "@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.15 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "0.3.15" --- # @conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.15 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Soft block: AI-agent control surface** — Warn by default; block when configured. Package installation can alter behavior/instructions of installed Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Copilot, OpenCode, Windsurf, and Agent environments. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Warn by default - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Soft block: AI-agent control surface - **Selected version:** 0.3.15 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. npm installation silently invokes the CLI with force enabled. The CLI detects existing AI-editor configuration directories and writes package-controlled skills and agents into multiple global editor control surfaces. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-09T12:41:09.478Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-09T12:42:08.573Z - **Download time:** 505 ms - **Static scan time:** 848 ms - **AI review time:** 57741 ms - **Total time:** 59095 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** npm installation silently invokes the CLI with force enabled. The CLI detects existing AI-editor configuration directories and writes package-controlled skills and agents into multiple global editor control surfaces. - **Trigger:** npm postinstall - **Impact:** Package installation can alter behavior/instructions of installed Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Copilot, OpenCode, Windsurf, and Agent environments. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/postinstall.js, bin/cli.js, dist/index.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-09T12:42:08.573Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** unconsented forced global AI-agent skill and agent installation - **Attack narrative:** On npm install, package.json launches bin/postinstall.js. It silently executes the package CLI as \`skill install --force\`; the CLI defaults to global installation and enumerates existing AI-editor directories. Its installer force-overwrites package-controlled skill files across detected editor control surfaces and writes agent definitions to global Claude, Copilot, and Codex agent directories. This occurs without an explicit user command or consent. - **Rationale:** This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. It meets the firewall block boundary even though the postinstall itself has no observed network exfiltration. - **Files touched:** package.json, bin/postinstall.js, bin/cli.js, dist/index.js, ~/.claude/skills/\*, ~/.cursor/skills/\*, ~/.codex/skills/\*, ~/.claude/agents/\*, ~/.github/agents/\*, ~/.codex/agents/\* ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 98.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** package.json runs postinstall automatically., bin/postinstall.js executes \`skill install --force\`., dist/index.js force-writes skills to detected ~/.claude, ~/.cursor, ~/.codex and other editor directories., dist/index.js also force-writes agents under ~/.claude/agents, ~/.github/agents, and ~/.codex/agents. - **Evidence against:** No network or credential collection occurs in bin/postinstall.js., The skill/agent content is package-provided rather than downloaded during postinstall. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** bin/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: L8: import { execSync } from "child_process"; L9: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 10. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var h={id:"mindframes",name:"mindframes",displayName:"Mindframes",description:"CLI tool for Mindframes presentation generation",commands:["mf","mindframes"],apiUrl:"https://www.min... L4: `)}function dr(e){let n=[...e].sort((r,i)=>{if(r.isDefault&&!i.isDefault)return-1;if(!r.isDefault&&i.isDefault)return 1;let a=r.createdAt?new Date(r.createdAt).getTime():0;return(i... ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var h={id:"mindframes",name:"mindframes",displayName:"Mindframes",description:"CLI tool for Mindframes presentation generation",commands:["mf","mindframes"],apiUrl:"https://www.min... L4: `)}function dr(e){let n=[...e].sort((r,i)=>{if(r.isDefault&&!i.isDefault)return-1;if(!r.isDefault&&i.isDefault)return 1;let a=r.createdAt?new Date(r.createdAt).getTime():0;return(i... ``` ### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/cli.js -> dist/index.js L2: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url); L3: var h={id:"mindframes",name:"mindframes",displayName:"Mindframes",description:"CLI tool for Mindframes presentation generation",commands:["mf","mindframes"],apiUrl:"https://www.min... L4: `)}function dr(e){let n=[...e].sort((r,i)=>{if(r.isDefault&&!i.isDefault)return-1;if(!r.isDefault&&i.isDefault)return 1;let a=r.createdAt?new Date(r.createdAt).getTime():0;return(i... ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 16. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 17. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.2 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.3.2 similarity = 0.667 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 14 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 9 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.168 (Dependency) - @inquirer/prompts 8.5.2 (Dependency) - @openai/codex-sdk ^0.142.5 (Dependency) - @remotion/bundler 4.0.375 (Dependency) - @remotion/renderer 4.0.375 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - cli-table3 ^0.6.5 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - conf ^13.0.1 (Dependency) - eventsource-parser ^3.0.0 (Dependency) - ffmpeg-static 5.3.0 (Dependency) - inquirer ^12.6.0 (Dependency) - open 11.0.0 (Dependency) - ora ^8.1.1 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @conceptcraft/mindframes - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.3.15 - **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE - **Version published:** 2026-08-07T20:59:47.163Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-15T16:03:27.565Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-09T12:42:08.573Z - **Known versions:** 4 - **Latest version:** 0.3.15 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** CLI tool for creating AI-powered presentations with ConceptCraft - **Author:** ConceptCraft AI - **Keywords:** conceptcraft, slides, presentation, ai, cli, powerpoint, deck, generator - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=23.5.0 || ^22.13.0 || ^20.17.0 - **Artifact files:** 6 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 316,521 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Homepage]()