---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@conceptcraft/mindframes/v/0.3.32"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@conceptcraft/mindframes/v/0.3.32.md"
package: "@conceptcraft/mindframes"
report_status: "published"
title: "@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.3.32"
---

# @conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.3.32
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The postinstall hook performs automatic first-party agent skill setup and can overwrite existing skill files, which warrants a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected behavior does not establish a malicious attack or broad control-surface mutation.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 92.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-08T22:52:28.580Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-08T22:52:58.400Z
- **Download time:** 2029 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1630 ms
- **AI review time:** 26159 ms
- **Total time:** 29820 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The postinstall hook automatically installs or replaces this package's skills in supported agent skill directories. This is first-party agent extension setup; no broader agent configuration mutation or confirmed attack was identified.

- **Trigger:** npm package installation runs the postinstall hook.

- **Impact:** Package-owned skill content may be added or replaced without a separate prompt during npm installation.

- **Evidence paths:** bin/postinstall.js, dist/index.js, package.json

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-08T22:52:58.400Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook invokes the package CLI with skill install --force; the installer writes package skills beneath detected agent directories and can overwrite existing skill files.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall hook performs automatic first-party agent skill setup and can overwrite existing skill files, which warrants a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected behavior does not establish a malicious attack or broad control-surface mutation.

- **Files touched:** bin/postinstall.js, dist/index.js, package.json

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 92.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs bin/postinstall.js automatically after installation., The hook runs the package CLI's skill installer with --force and suppresses command output., The installer targets existing supported agent directories and writes skills beneath their skills subdirectories, overwriting existing skill files when forced., The agent configuration location is a Codex session-file lookup, not an agent configuration write.

- **Evidence against:** Skill installation is limited to package-provided skill files; the installer does not write broad agent settings or control configuration., The configured external skill list is empty, and no unconsented external skill download is performed by the hook.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32.

- Review the evidence and your use of @conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/postinstall.js
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/bin/postinstall.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: 
L8: import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
L9: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
```

### 6. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 7. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 8. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 9. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 10. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/dist/index.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var h={id:"mindframes",name:"mindframes",displayName:"Mindframes",description:"CLI tool for Mindframes presentation generation",commands:["mf","mindframes"],apiUrl:"https://www.min...
L4: `);let e=Qh.createInterface({input:process.stdin,terminal:process.stdin.isTTY===!0});try{return(await new Promise(i=>{if(process.stdin.isTTY){e.question(`Approve this exact request...
L5: Then paste the approval receipt: `,i);return}let o=!1,c=m=>{o||(o=!0,i(m))};e.on("line",c),e.on("close",()=>c(""))})).trim()||void 0}finally{e.close()}}import{spawnSync as Zh}from"...
L6: `):null}var gn="terminalRunFailure",de=class extends Error{[gn]=!0};function fn(t){return!!t&&typeof t=="object"&&t[gn]===!0}function oe(t,e
```

### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/dist/index.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var h={id:"mindframes",name:"mindframes",displayName:"Mindframes",description:"CLI tool for Mindframes presentation generation",commands:["mf","mindframes"],apiUrl:"https://www.min...
L4: `);let e=Qh.createInterface({input:process.stdin,terminal:process.stdin.isTTY===!0});try{return(await new Promise(i=>{if(process.stdin.isTTY){e.question(`Approve this exact request...
L5: Then paste the approval receipt: `,i);return}let o=!1,c=m=>{o||(o=!0,i(m))};e.on("line",c),e.on("close",()=>c(""))})).trim()||void 0}finally{e.close()}}import{spawnSync as Zh}from"...
L6: `):null}var gn="terminalRunFailure",de=class extends Error{[gn]=!0};function fn(t){return!!t&&typeof t=="object"&&t[gn]===!0}function oe(t,e
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/dist/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> bin/cli.js -> dist/index.js
L2: import { createRequire } from 'module'; const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L3: var h={id:"mindframes",name:"mindframes",displayName:"Mindframes",description:"CLI tool for Mindframes presentation generation",commands:["mf","mindframes"],apiUrl:"https://www.min...
L4: `);let e=Qh.createInterface({input:process.stdin,terminal:process.stdin.isTTY===!0});try{return(await new Promise(i=>{if(process.stdin.isTTY){e.question(`Approve this exact request...
L5: Then paste the approval receipt: `,i);return}let o=!1,c=m=>{o||(o=!0,i(m))};e.on("line",c),e.on("close",()=>c(""))})).trim()||void 0}finally{e.close()}}import{spawnSync as Zh}from"...
L6: `):null}var gn="terminalRunFailure",de=clas
```

### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 14. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 16. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** bin/postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.32/bin/postinstall.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @conceptcraft/mindframes@0.3.21
matchedPath = bin/postinstall.js
matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.3.21
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 15
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 9
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 15

### Published dependency entries
- @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.168 (Dependency)
- @inquirer/prompts 8.5.2 (Dependency)
- @openai/codex-sdk ^0.142.5 (Dependency)
- @remotion/bundler 4.0.375 (Dependency)
- @remotion/renderer 4.0.375 (Dependency)
- ajv ^8.17.1 (Dependency)
- chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency)
- cli-table3 ^0.6.5 (Dependency)
- commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency)
- conf ^13.0.1 (Dependency)
- eventsource-parser ^3.0.0 (Dependency)
- ffmpeg-static 5.3.0 (Dependency)
- inquirer ^12.6.0 (Dependency)
- open 11.0.0 (Dependency)
- ora ^8.1.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @conceptcraft/mindframes
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.3.32
- **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE
- **Version published:** 2026-10-08T22:50:56.649Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-09T12:42:02.096Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-18T11:58:09.253Z
- **Known versions:** 29
- **Latest version:** 0.3.46
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** CLI tool for creating AI-powered presentations with ConceptCraft
- **Author:** ConceptCraft AI
- **Maintainers:** amish\_cc
- **Keywords:** conceptcraft, slides, presentation, ai, cli, powerpoint, deck, generator
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.22 \<23
- **Artifact files:** 6
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 858,615 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@conceptcraft/mindframes/v/0.3.32>)
- [Homepage](<https://conceptcraft.ai/>)
