@contrail/cli@3.5.7
VibeIQ's Contrail Platform CLI.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install-time behavior that exfiltrates data, but its explicit app publishing workflow silently bundles identifying workstation and Git metadata with the build and uploads it. This is suspicious telemetry to the package's service, rather than evidence of a malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- App build metadata collects the machine hostname, home and temporary directories, working directory, and the build user's name.
- The helper reads Git details including the remote URL and commit message; the metadata is added to the app package and uploaded to a signed URL during publishing.
- The collection and upload occur through the explicit app publish/deploy workflow.
- The manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and the package entry points launch the oclif CLI.
- Packaging and uploading an app build is part of the CLI's stated purpose; no unrelated collector or automatic startup transmission was identified.
Source & flagged code
12 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/helpers/app/metadata-extractor.jsView on unpkg · L5Package source references shell execution.
node_modules/@opentelemetry/otlp-transformer/node_modules/@opentelemetry/resources/build/esm/detectors/platform/node/machine-id/execAsync.jsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @contrail/cli@3.5.7.
See all versions of @contrail/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @contrail/cli@3.5.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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