@cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.43.0: Suspicious npm security | LPM Firewall

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@cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.43.0: Suspicious npm security | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

dist/serve.jsView file

1// src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { once } from "node:events"; ... L8: function resolveOpencodeBin() { L9: const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim(); L10: if (override) return override; L11: if (process.platform !== "win32") return "opencode"; L12: for (const dir of (process.env.PATH ?? "").split(delimiter)) { ... L31: async function killServe(serve) { L32: if (serve.exitCode !== null || serve.signalCode !== null) return; L33: serve.kill("SIGTERM");

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

1// src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

45if (process.platform === "win32") { L46: return execFileSync("powershell.exe", [ L47: "-NoProfile",

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L45

1// src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { once } from "node:events"; ... L8: function resolveOpencodeBin() { L9: const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim(); L10: if (override) return override;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

1// src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { once } from "node:events"; ... L8: function resolveOpencodeBin() { L9: const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim(); L10: if (override) return override; L11: if (process.platform !== "win32") return "opencode"; L12: for (const dir of (process.env.PATH ?? "").split(delimiter)) { ... L31: async function killServe(serve) { L32: if (serve.exitCode !== null || serve.signalCode !== null) return; L33: serve.kill("SIGTERM");

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/index.jsView file

7Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/plugin.bundle.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: // src/extension.ts L8: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L24: import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; L25: function controlEndpoint(space, name, token = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")) { L26: const id = createHash("sha256").update(`${space}\0${name}\0${process.pid}\0${token}`).digest("base64url").slice(0, 32); L27: const path = process.platform === "win32" ? `\\\\.\\pipe\\cotal-${id}` : join(tmpdir(), `cotal-${id}.sock`); L28: return { path, token }; ... L110: const sourceKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map(); L111: for (const k of Object.keys(process.env)) L112: sou

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L7

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

dist/serve.jsView file

Lines 1-65javascript

1// src/serve.ts

2import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process";

3import { createServer } from "node:net";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

4import { once } from "node:events";

5import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";

6import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";

7import { delimiter, join } from "node:path";

8function resolveOpencodeBin() {

9 const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim();

10 if (override) return override;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

11 if (process.platform !== "win32") return "opencode";

12 for (const dir of (process.env.PATH ?? "").split(delimiter)) {

13 if (!dir) continue;

14 for (const exe of [join(dir, "opencode.exe"), join(dir, "node_modules", "opencode-ai", "bin", "opencode.exe")]) {

15 if (existsSync(exe)) return exe;

16 }

17 }

18 return "opencode";

19}

20var BIN = resolveOpencodeBin();

21var USERNAME = "opencode";

25 srv.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");

26 await once(srv, "listening");

27 const port = srv.address().port;

28 await new Promise((r) => srv.close(() => r()));

29 return port;

30}

31async function killServe(serve) {

32 if (serve.exitCode !== null || serve.signalCode !== null) return;

33 serve.kill("SIGTERM");

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L1

34 const dead = await Promise.race([

35 once(serve, "exit").then(() => true),

36 new Promise((r) => setTimeout(() => r(false), 3e3))

37 ]);

38 if (!dead) {

39 serve.kill("SIGKILL");

40 await once(serve, "exit");

41 }

42}

43function processCommand(pid) {

44 try {

45 if (process.platform === "win32") {

46 return execFileSync("powershell.exe", [

47 "-NoProfile",

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/serve.jsView on unpkg · L45

48 "-NonInteractive",

49 "-Command",

50 `(Get-CimInstance Win32_Process -Filter 'ProcessId = ${pid}').CommandLine`

51 ], { encoding: "utf8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim();

52 }

53 return execFileSync("ps", ["-p", String(pid), "-o", "command="], {

54 encoding: "utf8",

55 stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"]

56 }).trim();

57 } catch {

58 return void 0;

59 }

60}

61function isLiveOpencodeServe(pid) {

62 if (!Number.isInteger(pid) || pid <= 0) return false;

63 try {

64 process.kill(pid, 0);

65 } catch {

dist/index.jsView file

7Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/plugin.bundle.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: // src/extension.ts L8: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L24: import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; L25: function controlEndpoint(space, name, token = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")) { L26: const id = createHash("sha256").update(`${space}\0${name}\0${process.pid}\0${token}`).digest("base64url").slice(0, 32); L27: const path = process.platform === "win32" ? `\\\\.\\pipe\\cotal-${id}` : join(tmpdir(), `cotal-${id}.sock`); L28: return { path, token }; ... L110: const sourceKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map(); L111: for (const k of Object.keys(process.env)) L112: sou

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L7