--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@cotal-ai/connector-opencode" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@cotal-ai/connector-opencode/v/0.51.0.md" package: "@cotal-ai/connector-opencode" report_status: "published" title: "@cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.51.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.51.0" --- # @cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.51.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 0.51.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The connector injects a first-party OpenCode plugin with allowed tool permission into each managed launch. No confirmed malicious attack surface was identified. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-28T02:28:09.212Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-28T02:31:13.470Z - **Download time:** 1524 ms - **Static scan time:** 3364 ms - **AI review time:** 179369 ms - **Total time:** 184258 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The connector injects a first-party OpenCode plugin with allowed tool permission into each managed launch. No confirmed malicious attack surface was identified. - **Trigger:** A Cotal-managed OpenCode connector launch. - **Impact:** This grants the bundled extension capability within the managed agent session, but the inspected server endpoint is loopback and no unconsented install-time configuration change was found. - **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js, dist/plugin.bundle.js, dist/serve.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-28T02:31:13.470Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The launcher passes inline configuration that loads the plugin; the plugin uses runtime credentials to call the launched OpenCode server. - **Rationale:** This is a first-party, runtime agent-extension setup rather than an npm install hook or demonstrated attack. It remains a guarded agent-extension lifecycle risk because the launch configuration enables a tool-capable injected plugin. - **Files touched:** .cotal/opencode - **Network endpoints:** http://127.0.0.1 ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for warning:** The package exposes an import entrypoint and has no npm lifecycle hook., The connector builds an OpenCode configuration that permits tools and injects its bundled plugin for each launch., The injected plugin activates only for a managed Cotal session and obtains its server address and password from environment variables., The serve shim binds the OpenCode service to loopback and requires a caller-provided data root., The plugin sends authenticated API requests only to the configured OpenCode server address. - **Evidence against:** No install-time mutation, remote endpoint, credential export, or destructive behavior was established. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.51.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.51.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/serve.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: // src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; ``` ### 3. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/serve.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: // src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { once } from "node:events"; ... L8: function resolveOpencodeBin() { L9: const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim(); L10: if (override) return override; ``` ### 8. Critical: Reverse Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 92.0% - **Path:** dist/serve.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: // src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { once } from "node:events"; ... L8: function resolveOpencodeBin() { L9: const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim(); L10: if (override) return override; L11: if (process.platform !== "win32") return "opencode"; L12: for (const dir of (process.env.PATH ?? "").split(delimiter)) { ... L31: async function killServe(serve) { L32: if (serve.exitCode !== null || serve.signalCode !== null) return; L33: serve.kill("SIGTERM"); ``` ### 9. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/serve.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: // src/serve.ts L2: import { execFileSync, spawn } from "node:child_process"; L3: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L4: import { once } from "node:events"; ... L8: function resolveOpencodeBin() { L9: const override = process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_BIN?.trim() || process.env.COTAL_OPENCODE_RESOLVED_BIN?.trim(); L10: if (override) return override; L11: if (process.platform !== "win32") return "opencode"; L12: for (const dir of (process.env.PATH ?? "").split(delimiter)) { ... L31: async function killServe(serve) { L32: if (serve.exitCode !== null || serve.signalCode !== null) return; L33: serve.kill("SIGTERM"); ``` ### 10. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/plugin.bundle.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L7: // src/extension.ts L8: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L24: import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto"; L25: var SUN_PATH_MAX_BYTES = process.platform === "darwin" ? 104 : 108; L26: function controlEndpoint(space, name, token = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")) { L27: const id = createHash("sha256").update(`${space}\0${name}\0${process.pid}\0${token}`).digest("base64url").slice(0, 32); ... L115: const sourceKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map(); L116: for (const k of Object.keys(process.env)) L117: sourceKey.set(k.toLowerCase(), k); ... L1810: error: new (_Err ?? $ZodErr ``` ### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 12. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 85.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/plugin.bundle.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.29.0 matchedPath = dist/plugin.bundle.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.29.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 15. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @cotal-ai/connector-opencode@0.55.0 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.55.0 similarity = 0.667 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 1 - **Development dependencies:** 6 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 1 ### Published dependency entries - @cotal-ai/core \>=0.1.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @cotal-ai/connector-opencode - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.51.0 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-23T15:38:13.919Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T23:14:39.063Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-07T23:54:22.887Z - **Known versions:** 62 - **Latest version:** 0.73.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Cotal connector for OpenCode: a native in-process plugin that joins a session to the mesh. - **Maintainers:** cotal-ai - **Artifact files:** 22 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 5,573,954 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]()