@crouton-kit/crouter@0.3.67
crtr — agent runtime with memory, plugins, and marketplaces
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection does not support the scanner's malicious verdict. The cross-host configuration writes are user-triggered and guarded, but warrant a warning under the firewall policy for explicit AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/cli.js invokes host export provisioning on CLI runs.
- dist/core/host-exports/export.js writes marker-owned templates to existing ~/.claude and ~/.pi agent command directories.
- scripts/postinstall.mjs patches a version-pinned dependency file during install.
- Postinstall only alters one exact pi UI ordering expression; no network or credential access.
- Host exports require an explicit CLI invocation, existing host roots, and do not overwrite markerless user files.
- Runtime self-update and plugin installation are exposed through user-invoked commands.
- No source evidence of stealth exfiltration, remote payload execution, or destructive foreign-agent takeover.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/clients/web/web-cmd.jsView on unpkg · L12Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @crouton-kit/crouter@0.3.67.
See all versions of @crouton-kit/crouter for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @crouton-kit/crouter@0.3.67 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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