registry  /  @dawipong/opcflow  /  0.6.0

@dawipong/opcflow@0.6.0

Spec-anchored, drift-enforced execution layer for AI coding agents — artifact DAG, trust gates, multi-role pipeline; generates agents/MCP/hooks for Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode & Cursor.

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a CLI/workbench that can explicitly generate project agent configs, MCP registration, hooks, docs, and a local database as its advertised function.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs opcflow init, gen-agents, install-hooks, serve, mcp, or related CLI commands.
Impact
Project files may be created or updated for opcflow workflow integration; no unconsented install-time mutation or exfiltration found.
Mechanism
Explicit user-command project scaffolding and workflow automation
Rationale
Source inspection shows potentially sensitive primitives are user-invoked and aligned with the package's documented AI-workflow scaffolding purpose. There is no install-time execution, credential harvesting, remote code loading, or unconsented broad AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.mjsREADME.en.mdweb/dist/assets/chunk-KEIR6QF5-BfrZ3jm6.jsworkbench.config.jsondocs/.workbench/.mcp.json.claude/settings.json.codex/config.tomlopencode.json.opencode/plugins/opcflow.ts.cursor/mcp.json.cursor/hooks.json.git/hooks/post-commit.git/hooks/prepare-commit-msg
Network endpoints2
models.dev/api.json127.0.0.1:5620

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/cli.mjs can write AI-agent MCP/hook config for Claude, Codex, OpenCode, and Cursor during explicit init/gen commands.
  • dist/cli.mjs installs git hooks only via init when .git exists or explicit install-hooks command.
  • dist/cli.mjs fetches https://models.dev/api.json during interactive init model selection.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall; only prepublishOnly build for publisher workflow.
  • Agent/MCP/hook writes are documented package purpose in README.en.md and are activated by user CLI commands, not install/import.
  • dist/cli.mjs child_process usage is package-aligned git/gh operations or generated local hook forwarding, not remote payload execution.
  • No credential harvesting or exfiltration endpoint found; network is models.dev metadata and local serve/SSE.
  • Scanner Unicode hit in web/dist/assets/chunk-KEIR6QF5-BfrZ3jm6.js appears bundled parser/whitespace handling, not Trojan Source control flow.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedObfuscatedProtestwareUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 96 file(s), 4.68 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, cdn.jsdelivr.net, chevrotain.io, en.wikipedia.org, github.com, langium.org, opencode.ai, reactflow.dev, reactjs.org, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

2 flagged · loading source
dist/cli.mjsView file
19import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path"; L20: function findProjectRoot(from = process.cwd()) { L21: let dir = resolve(from); ... L31: if (!existsSync(file)) return { ...DEFAULTS }; L32: const raw = JSON.parse( L33: readFileSync(file, "utf-8") ... L348: IGNORE_DIRS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["node_modules", ".git", "dist", "build", ".workbench"]); L349: IGNORE_FILES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["pnpm-lock.yaml", "package-lock.json", "yarn.lock", ".DS_Store", "Thumbs.db"]); L350: } ... L514: }), L515: respondBlocked: (msg) => ({ exitCode: 2, stderr: msg }), L516: formatModel: (_providerId, modelId) => modelId,
Low
Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/cli.mjsView on unpkg · L19
web/dist/assets/chunk-KEIR6QF5-BfrZ3jm6.jsView file
46contains invisible/control Unicode U+FEFF (zero width no-break space) \r \v \xA0            \u2028\u2029   <U+FEFF>`.split(``);function Da(e){let t=typeof e==`string`?new RegExp(e):e;return Ea.some(e=>t.test(e))}o(Da,`isWhitespace`);function Oa(e){return e.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g,`\\$&`)}o(Oa,`escapeReg
Critical
Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

web/dist/assets/chunk-KEIR6QF5-BfrZ3jm6.jsView on unpkg · L46

Findings

1 Critical4 Medium7 Low
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeweb/dist/assets/chunk-KEIR6QF5-BfrZ3jm6.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumProtestware
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/cli.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowObfuscated
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings