@db-tools/main-app@2026.6.30

package.json declares a preinstall hook `npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js` that fires on every `npm install`. examples/verify.js calls the library's init() with no DSN, which falls back to a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN in src/index.js (`https://...@o4511652642947072.ingest.de.sentry.io/4511652667785296`). verify.js then invokes setUserFromPublicIp() which fetches the installer's public egress IP from `https://www.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/trace`, attaches it as Sentry user context, throws a synthetic exception, and flushes it to the author-controlled Sentry project. The installer has no opportunity to configure or opt out — the data flow is unconditional and non-consensual on `npm install`. Separately, the exported init() API uses the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN as its final fallback (after options.dsn and process.env.SENTRY_DSN) and sets `sendDefaultPii: true`, so any consumer that uses the library without explicitly supplying a DSN silently routes their application's exceptions and PII to the same author-owned Sentry project, with no disclosure in the README.