@decentnetwork/lan@0.1.273
Private virtual LAN for self-hosted services and AI agents, built on Elastos Carrier. NAT-traversal, name service, ACL, all over a peer-to-peer mesh — no public IP required.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo source evidence supports intentional malware or install-time abuse, but the privileged IPC design creates a concrete, high-impact local file-exfiltration vulnerability. Warn rather than block because persistence requires explicit user service installation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/daemon/ipc.js chmods the daemon socket to 0666.
- IPC accepts unauthenticated requests from any socket client.
- dist/daemon/server.js fileSend reads caller-supplied paths with fs.readFile.
- The explicit service installer runs the daemon as root.
- package.json has no install/postinstall hook; only prepublishOnly.
- Service persistence is exposed only through an explicit CLI command.
- No hidden eval, remote payload loader, or foreign AI-agent config mutation found.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedSource writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/ui/server.jsView on unpkg · L14Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @decentnetwork/lan@0.1.273.
See all versions of @decentnetwork/lan for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @decentnetwork/lan@0.1.273 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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