registry  /  @defend-tech/opencode-optima  /  0.1.109

@defend-tech/opencode-optima@0.1.109

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AI Security Review

scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was found. The package is a high-capability OpenCode workflow plugin, but the risky primitives are exposed as configured or user-invoked workflow, QA, ClickUp, GitHub, and sanitizer features.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
OpenCode plugin load/configuration or explicit optima/CLI tool invocation
Impact
Can modify configured workflow state and external ClickUp/GitHub resources when the user enables and invokes those features; no stealth install-time execution or credential exfiltration observed.
Mechanism
workflow automation plugin with configured API clients and local runtime file writes
Rationale
Static inspection shows a legitimate but powerful OpenCode automation plugin with no lifecycle hook, hidden downloader, credential harvesting, or unaligned exfiltration path. The AI-agent and browser-control surfaces are visible package features gated by plugin configuration or explicit tool calls, so the scanner signals are package-aligned rather than malicious.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/sanitize_cli.jsscripts/optima-sanitize-host.js
Network endpoints5
api.clickup.com/api/v2api.github.com127.0.0.1:3001127.0.0.1:9223chatgpt.com/

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/index.js registers powerful OpenCode tools that can prompt sessions, mutate configured ClickUp/GitHub state, and run QA browser commands when invoked.
  • dist/index.js syncs Optima-managed agent markdown into process.env.OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR during plugin config when enabled.
  • dist/sanitize_cli.js user-invoked host sanitizer can SSH to a supplied host and remove legacy override markdown after backup.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall lifecycle hooks; prepack is publish-time build only.
  • dist/index.js exports an OpenCode plugin; network calls target configured ClickUp/GitHub/OpenCode/CDP services, not hardcoded exfil infrastructure.
  • Dynamic Function usage is confined to explicit optima_qa_chrome_command script actions supplied by the tool caller.
  • Secrets are resolved from configured references for API clients and used as Authorization headers to ClickUp/GitHub APIs.
  • scripts/optima-sanitize-host.js only imports the bundled CLI and calls main; no hidden install-time behavior found.
  • File writes are plugin-aligned project/runtime artifacts such as .optima state, generated policies, QA artifacts, and managed OpenCode agents.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 3 file(s), 1.49 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.clickup.com, api.github.com, chatgpt.com, git-scm.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source
dist/index.jsView file
9316import path5 from "node:path"; L9317: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9318: function toGitPath(worktree, targetPath) {
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9316
14554if (!script.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "script_required" }; L14555: const fn = new Function("page", "context", "browser", "artifactsDir", `return (async () => { L14556: ${script} ... L14562: } L14563: async function withQaBrowser({ provider = DEFAULT_QA_PROVIDER, cdpUrl = "", clickupTaskId = "", startUrl = "https://chatgpt.com/" } = {}, callback) { L14564: const chromium = await loadPlaywrightChromium(); L14565: const browser = await chromium.connectOverCDP(normalizeCdpUrl(cdpUrl), { L14566: timeout: Number(process.env.OPTIMA_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS || DEFAULT_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS) L14567: });
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14554
14079const browser = {}; L14080: const fn = new Function("cdp", "target", "artifactsDir", "command", "page", "context", "browser", `return (async () => { L14081: ${script}
Low
Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14079
scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView file
9const cliPath = fs.existsSync(sourceCli) ? sourceCli : distCli; L10: const { main } = await import(cliPath); L11:
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView on unpkg · L9
dist/sanitize_cli.jsView file
2592Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/sanitize_cli.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2592: if (typeof node_buffer.Buffer === "function") { L2593: return node_buffer.Buffer.from(src, "base64"); L2594: } else if (typeof atob === "function") { ... L5197: yield* this.next(token); L5198: yield* this.end(forceDoc, endOffset); L5199: } ... L5201: *next(token) { L5202: if (node_process.env.LOG_STREAM) L5203: console.dir(token, { depth: null }); ... L7491: // WTF! L7492: // https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore L7493: // changes in [2.22.1](https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore/2.22.1)
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/sanitize_cli.jsView on unpkg · L2592

Findings

4 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/sanitize_cli.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/optima-sanitize-host.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/index.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License