registry  /  @defend-tech/opencode-optima  /  0.1.113

@defend-tech/opencode-optima@0.1.113

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AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was found. The risky primitives are part of an OpenCode workflow plugin and are activated by plugin configuration or explicit tool/CLI use.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
OpenCode loads the plugin, or a user invokes Optima tools/optima-sanitize-host
Impact
Package-aligned writes to .optima and OpenCode agent config; configured API calls and browser automation when requested
Mechanism
OpenCode agent orchestration, repo artifact management, configured API integrations, and user-directed browser automation
Rationale
Static inspection shows a feature-rich OpenCode plugin with powerful but documented/user-invoked agent, browser, API, and repair capabilities. I did not find install-time execution, stealth exfiltration, credential harvesting, or unconsented AI-agent control mutation beyond the plugin's declared purpose.
Evidence
package.jsonREADME.mddist/index.jsdist/sanitize_cli.jsscripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsdocs/setup/CONFIGURATION.md.optima/OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents/*.md~/.local/share/opencode_defend/opencode/opencode.db~/.optima_sanitize_backup/*.zip
Network endpoints6
api.clickup.com/api/v2api.github.com127.0.0.1:3001127.0.0.1:9223chatgpt.comauth.openai.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 82.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/index.js writes Optima-managed agent markdown into OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents during plugin config
  • dist/index.js exposes user-invoked QA browser tools that evaluate provided expressions/scripts via CDP/Playwright
  • dist/index.js can call ClickUp/GitHub/OpenCode HTTP APIs when configured with tokens/base URLs
  • dist/sanitize_cli.js user-invoked CLI can run ssh for --host and remove backed-up legacy override files
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall lifecycle hooks
  • README.md describes an OpenCode plugin that installs role agents and .optima workflow artifacts
  • Network endpoints are package-aligned: ClickUp API, GitHub API, local OpenCode/CDP, ChatGPT QA tab
  • Secrets are read only from explicit config references like {env:VAR} or {file:path} for configured API clients
  • Shell/child_process use is limited to user-invoked git/systemctl/ssh/python helper paths, not import-time execution
  • No evidence of credential harvesting, hidden exfiltration, persistence, destructive install-time behavior, or reviewer prompt injection
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 3 file(s), 1.51 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.clickup.com, api.github.com, auth.openai.com, chatgpt.com, git-scm.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source
dist/index.jsView file
9380import path5 from "node:path"; L9381: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9382: function toGitPath(worktree, targetPath) {
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9380
14719if (!script.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "script_required" }; L14720: const fn = new Function("page", "context", "browser", "artifactsDir", `return (async () => { L14721: ${script} ... L14727: } L14728: async function withQaBrowser({ provider = DEFAULT_QA_PROVIDER, cdpUrl = "", clickupTaskId = "", startUrl = "https://chatgpt.com/" } = {}, callback) { L14729: const chromium = await loadPlaywrightChromium(); L14730: const browser = await chromium.connectOverCDP(normalizeCdpUrl(cdpUrl), { L14731: timeout: Number(process.env.OPTIMA_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS || DEFAULT_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS) L14732: });
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14719
14163const browser = {}; L14164: const fn = new Function("cdp", "target", "artifactsDir", "command", "page", "context", "browser", `return (async () => { L14165: ${script}
Low
Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14163
scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView file
9const cliPath = fs.existsSync(sourceCli) ? sourceCli : distCli; L10: const { main } = await import(cliPath); L11:
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView on unpkg · L9
dist/sanitize_cli.jsView file
2592Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/sanitize_cli.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2592: if (typeof node_buffer.Buffer === "function") { L2593: return node_buffer.Buffer.from(src, "base64"); L2594: } else if (typeof atob === "function") { ... L5197: yield* this.next(token); L5198: yield* this.end(forceDoc, endOffset); L5199: } ... L5201: *next(token) { L5202: if (node_process.env.LOG_STREAM) L5203: console.dir(token, { depth: null }); ... L7491: // WTF! L7492: // https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore L7493: // changes in [2.22.1](https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore/2.22.1)
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/sanitize_cli.jsView on unpkg · L2592

Findings

4 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/sanitize_cli.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/optima-sanitize-host.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/index.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License