registry  /  @defend-tech/opencode-optima  /  0.1.114

@defend-tech/opencode-optima@0.1.114

> Don't just code with AI. Build enterprise-grade software.

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was found. The package is an OpenCode workflow plugin with privileged, user-invoked automation features for agents, QA browser control, ClickUp/GitHub integration, and host sanitation.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
OpenCode plugin use or explicit optima-sanitize-host CLI invocation
Impact
Can modify project/OpenCode config and call configured services when enabled by the user.
Mechanism
configured workflow automation and browser/SCM integration
Rationale
Static inspection shows powerful but package-aligned automation capabilities gated by plugin/CLI usage, with no install-time execution, hidden endpoint, credential harvesting, or concrete malicious payload. The suspicious primitives are explainable by OpenCode agent orchestration, QA browser tooling, ClickUp/GitHub integrations, and an explicit sanitation CLI.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/sanitize_cli.jsscripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsOPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents/*.md.optima/.config/runtime/*.optima/tasks/*.local/share/opencode/opencode-optima/*
Network endpoints6
api.clickup.com/api/v2/api.github.com/127.0.0.1:9223127.0.0.1:3001chatgpt.com/auth.openai.com/

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 84.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/index.js exposes user-invoked QA tools that can run provided browser scripts via new Function.
  • dist/index.js can write OpenCode agent markdown under OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents during plugin config.
  • dist/sanitize_cli.js supports user-invoked host sanitation and optional ssh remote execution.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall lifecycle hooks.
  • Network use is aligned with configured ClickUp/GitHub APIs and local Chrome CDP, not hidden exfiltration.
  • dist/index.js child_process use is git operations and QA service helpers, not install/import-time execution.
  • dist/sanitize_cli.js main only runs when invoked as CLI; scripts/optima-sanitize-host.js only imports the bundled CLI.
  • No credential harvesting loop or hardcoded attacker endpoint found.
  • Agent/config writes are declared plugin behavior, controlled by repo config/env, not unconsented lifecycle mutation.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 3 file(s), 1.51 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.clickup.com, api.github.com, auth.openai.com, chatgpt.com, git-scm.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source
dist/index.jsView file
9380import path5 from "node:path"; L9381: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9382: function toGitPath(worktree, targetPath) {
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9380
14719if (!script.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "script_required" }; L14720: const fn = new Function("page", "context", "browser", "artifactsDir", `return (async () => { L14721: ${script} ... L14727: } L14728: async function withQaBrowser({ provider = DEFAULT_QA_PROVIDER, cdpUrl = "", clickupTaskId = "", startUrl = "https://chatgpt.com/" } = {}, callback) { L14729: const chromium = await loadPlaywrightChromium(); L14730: const browser = await chromium.connectOverCDP(normalizeCdpUrl(cdpUrl), { L14731: timeout: Number(process.env.OPTIMA_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS || DEFAULT_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS) L14732: });
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14719
14163const browser = {}; L14164: const fn = new Function("cdp", "target", "artifactsDir", "command", "page", "context", "browser", `return (async () => { L14165: ${script}
Low
Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14163
scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView file
9const cliPath = fs.existsSync(sourceCli) ? sourceCli : distCli; L10: const { main } = await import(cliPath); L11:
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView on unpkg · L9
dist/sanitize_cli.jsView file
2592Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/sanitize_cli.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2592: if (typeof node_buffer.Buffer === "function") { L2593: return node_buffer.Buffer.from(src, "base64"); L2594: } else if (typeof atob === "function") { ... L5197: yield* this.next(token); L5198: yield* this.end(forceDoc, endOffset); L5199: } ... L5201: *next(token) { L5202: if (node_process.env.LOG_STREAM) L5203: console.dir(token, { depth: null }); ... L7491: // WTF! L7492: // https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore L7493: // changes in [2.22.1](https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore/2.22.1)
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/sanitize_cli.jsView on unpkg · L2592

Findings

4 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/sanitize_cli.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/optima-sanitize-host.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/index.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License