registry  /  @defend-tech/opencode-optima  /  0.1.128

@defend-tech/opencode-optima@0.1.128

> Don't just code with AI. Build enterprise-grade software.

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. The risky primitives are part of documented OpenCode plugin, QA automation, ClickUp/GitHub integration, and explicit sanitize CLI behavior.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
OpenCode loads the configured plugin or user runs optima-sanitize-host
Impact
Can write Optima/OpenCode configuration and workflow artifacts when enabled, but no unconsented install-time execution or exfiltration was found
Mechanism
documented agent/workflow automation with user-configured integrations
Rationale
Static inspection found powerful but package-aligned OpenCode plugin behavior, with no lifecycle hook, hidden payload, credential exfiltration, or unconsented install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation. Mark clean despite scanner hits because execution and network paths are documented or user/config triggered.
Evidence
package.jsonREADME.mdscripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsdist/index.jsdist/sanitize_cli.js.optima/.config/OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents~/.local/share/opencode_defend/opencode/opencode.db~/.optima_sanitize_backup/
Network endpoints5
api.clickup.com/api/v2api.github.com127.0.0.1:9223chatgpt.comauth.openai.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with high false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/index.js writes OpenCode agent files and sets default_agent when plugin config hook runs
  • dist/index.js exposes user-invoked QA script execution via new Function
  • dist/sanitize_cli.js can mutate discovered Optima/OpenCode host metadata when its bin is explicitly run
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks
  • README.md describes an OpenCode plugin that installs and manages Optima agents and workflows
  • dist/index.js network calls are aligned to configured ClickUp, GitHub, local OpenCode/CDP, and ChatGPT QA workflows
  • scripts/optima-sanitize-host.js only imports the local source/dist CLI entrypoint
  • dist/sanitize_cli.js remote ssh path is gated by explicit --host CLI option
  • No import-time credential harvesting or exfiltration path found
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 3 file(s), 1.55 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.clickup.com, api.github.com, auth.openai.com, chatgpt.com, git-scm.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source
dist/index.jsView file
9385import path5 from "node:path"; L9386: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9387: function toGitPath(worktree, targetPath) {
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9385
14728if (!script.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "script_required" }; L14729: const fn = new Function("page", "context", "browser", "artifactsDir", `return (async () => { L14730: ${script} ... L14736: } L14737: async function withQaBrowser({ provider = DEFAULT_QA_PROVIDER, cdpUrl = "", clickupTaskId = "", startUrl = "https://chatgpt.com/" } = {}, callback) { L14738: const chromium = await loadPlaywrightChromium(); L14739: const browser = await chromium.connectOverCDP(normalizeCdpUrl(cdpUrl), { L14740: timeout: Number(process.env.OPTIMA_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS || DEFAULT_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS) L14741: });
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14728
14172const browser = {}; L14173: const fn = new Function("cdp", "target", "artifactsDir", "command", "page", "context", "browser", `return (async () => { L14174: ${script}
Low
Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14172
scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView file
9const cliPath = fs.existsSync(sourceCli) ? sourceCli : distCli; L10: const { main } = await import(cliPath); L11:
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView on unpkg · L9
dist/sanitize_cli.jsView file
2592Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/sanitize_cli.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2592: if (typeof node_buffer.Buffer === "function") { L2593: return node_buffer.Buffer.from(src, "base64"); L2594: } else if (typeof atob === "function") { ... L5197: yield* this.next(token); L5198: yield* this.end(forceDoc, endOffset); L5199: } ... L5201: *next(token) { L5202: if (node_process.env.LOG_STREAM) L5203: console.dir(token, { depth: null }); ... L7491: // WTF! L7492: // https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore L7493: // changes in [2.22.1](https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore/2.22.1)
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/sanitize_cli.jsView on unpkg · L2592

Findings

4 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/sanitize_cli.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/optima-sanitize-host.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/index.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License