registry  /  @defend-tech/opencode-optima  /  0.1.139

@defend-tech/opencode-optima@0.1.139

> ClickUp-first delivery automation for OpenCode teams.

AI Security Review

scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a powerful OpenCode workflow plugin with user/config-triggered agent generation, ClickUp/GitHub integration, and QA browser automation.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
OpenCode plugin load/config hook or explicit optima tools/CLI invocation
Impact
Can modify configured workflow files, OpenCode agent config, ClickUp/GitHub resources, and QA browser state when invoked/configured; no hidden malicious behavior confirmed.
Mechanism
workflow automation plugin with configured API clients and browser/CDP tools
Rationale
Static inspection shows risky primitives, but they are exposed as documented/user-invoked workflow automation for an OpenCode plugin rather than install-time or covert behavior. I found no credential harvesting, hidden exfiltration, payload staging, persistence, or unconsented AI-agent control mutation beyond the package-aligned config hook.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsdist/sanitize_cli.jsdist/index.jsOPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents/*.md.optima/.config/runtime/*.optima/tasks/*.optima/evidences/*.gitignore
Network endpoints6
api.clickup.com/api/v2/api.github.com/127.0.0.1:3001127.0.0.1:9223chatgpt.com/auth.openai.com/

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 83.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/index.js exposes user-invoked QA tools that can run supplied Playwright/CDP scripts via new Function.
  • dist/index.js config hook can write generated agent markdown under OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR/agents.
  • dist/index.js contains GitHub/ClickUp API clients and local CDP/browser automation endpoints.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/postinstall lifecycle hooks; main is an OpenCode plugin and bin is an explicit CLI.
  • scripts/optima-sanitize-host.js only resolves and imports the sanitize CLI, no hidden payload.
  • Network endpoints are package-aligned: api.clickup.com, api.github.com, local OpenCode/CDP, chatgpt.com/auth.openai.com browser targets.
  • Credential use is configuration-driven via ClickUp/GitHub tokens or env references, not broad env/file harvesting.
  • File writes are runtime/workflow state, generated Optima files, explicit OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR agents, or user-requested artifacts.
  • No obfuscated payload, persistence outside configured workflow dirs, destructive install-time behavior, or unconsented exfiltration found.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 3 file(s), 1.60 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.clickup.com, api.github.com, auth.openai.com, chatgpt.com, git-scm.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source
dist/index.jsView file
9406import path5 from "node:path"; L9407: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L9408: function toGitPath(worktree, targetPath) {
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L9406
14958if (!script.trim()) return { ok: false, error: "script_required" }; L14959: const fn = new Function("page", "context", "browser", "artifactsDir", `return (async () => { L14960: ${script} ... L14966: } L14967: async function withQaBrowser({ provider = DEFAULT_QA_PROVIDER, cdpUrl = "", clickupTaskId = "", startUrl = "https://chatgpt.com/" } = {}, callback) { L14968: const chromium = await loadPlaywrightChromium(); L14969: const browser = await chromium.connectOverCDP(normalizeCdpUrl(cdpUrl), { L14970: timeout: Number(process.env.OPTIMA_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS || DEFAULT_QA_PLAYWRIGHT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS) L14971: });
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14958
14402const browser = {}; L14403: const fn = new Function("cdp", "target", "artifactsDir", "command", "page", "context", "browser", `return (async () => { L14404: ${script}
Low
Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L14402
scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView file
9const cliPath = fs.existsSync(sourceCli) ? sourceCli : distCli; L10: const { main } = await import(cliPath); L11:
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

scripts/optima-sanitize-host.jsView on unpkg · L9
dist/sanitize_cli.jsView file
2592Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/sanitize_cli.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L2592: if (typeof node_buffer.Buffer === "function") { L2593: return node_buffer.Buffer.from(src, "base64"); L2594: } else if (typeof atob === "function") { ... L5197: yield* this.next(token); L5198: yield* this.end(forceDoc, endOffset); L5199: } ... L5201: *next(token) { L5202: if (node_process.env.LOG_STREAM) L5203: console.dir(token, { depth: null }); ... L7491: // WTF! L7492: // https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore L7493: // changes in [2.22.1](https://git-scm.com/docs/gitignore/2.22.1)
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/sanitize_cli.jsView on unpkg · L2592

Findings

4 High3 Medium6 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/index.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/sanitize_cli.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/optima-sanitize-host.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowEvaldist/index.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License