@delorenj/pjangler@1.3.0
Project subsystem bootstrapper CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious install-time chain was found. Warn because explicit use can persist AI-agent hooks that process prompts and code edits through an external CLI.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Explicit agent-hooks recipe installs a six-CLI hook topology.
- Scaffolded sync script writes per-user Codex hooks.
- Installed hooks pass edited-content snippets to the external hindsight CLI.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepublishOnly is publisher-time.
- Mutation requires an explicit pjangler add/init workflow and supports dry-run/opt-out.
- Codex hook changes are marker-scoped, backed up, and removable.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
.mise/scripts/versioning.shView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
.mise/scripts/versioning.shView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @delorenj/pjangler@1.3.0.
See all versions of @delorenj/pjangler for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @delorenj/pjangler@1.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.