@delorenj/pjangler@1.4.6
Project subsystem bootstrapper CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo concrete malicious install hook, payload execution, or credential theft was found. The explicit ability to modify Claude hook configuration is a meaningful agent-control capability, so it should be warned rather than blocked.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has CLI entrypoints and no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Board requests use supplied Plane credentials for the configured API endpoint.
- The MCP process uses standard input/output transport, not a network listener.
- The executable-looking code in the test path is a test fixture for environment-isolation checks.
- The shipped projector can explicitly install hooks into Claude settings, creating an agent-control capability.
- No automatic install-time execution, self-dependency, obfuscated payload, or credential exfiltration was found.
- The hook launcher validates its target and uses a restricted environment before invoking the local CLI.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceA package entrypoint or install-reachable source explicitly loads and activates an executable-looking payload from a test, fixture, or hidden path.
dist/index.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @delorenj/pjangler@1.4.6.
See all versions of @delorenj/pjangler for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @delorenj/pjangler@1.4.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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