registry / @delorenj/pjangler / 1.5.12

@delorenj/pjangler@1.5.12

Project subsystem bootstrapper CLI

AI Security Review

scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The cited sources show ordinary entrypoint metadata and skill-source lookup, without establishing a concrete attack. The scanner hints do not by themselves prove credential theft, malicious payload activation, or harmful agent-control changes.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

Using a CLI or service entrypoint that resolves project skill sources.

Impact

No malicious effect is established by the cited behavior.

Mechanism

The code includes default skill directories and combines them with configured roots for lookup; the inspected excerpt does not show agent configuration mutation or credential transmission.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 81.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest exposes CLI and service entrypoints and declares only a prepublishOnly lifecycle script, not an npm install hook.
The bundled entrypoints include a Codex skills directory among default skill search roots.
The main CLI combines default roots with configured roots when resolving skill sources.
The systemd registry installer is a separate script, and the flagged Python test refers to a packaged project-hooks script.

Evidence against

The inspected skill-root code searches configured directories; it does not itself establish mutation of an agent configuration or credential forwarding.
The flagged test source shown is test scaffolding that resolves a script path; no attack behavior is established by that excerpt.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

•path = dist/index.js kind = trigger_reachable_excluded_payload sizeBytes = 895794 triggerReachableSource = dist/index.js excludedPayload = .mise/scripts/versioning.sh

Critical

Trigger Reachable Excluded Directory Payload

A package entrypoint or install-reachable source explicitly loads and activates an executable-looking payload from a test, fixture, or hidden path.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

121// src/project/registryClient.ts L122: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L123: import { homedir as homedir2 } from "node:os";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L121

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: CREDENTIAL_KEY = /(?:^|[_-])(?:password|passwd|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key|credential|authorization)(?:$|[_-])/iu; `no Plane API key for workspace "${workspace}": set ${planeApiKeyNames(workspace).join(" or ")}, or add one to ${ctx.env.HERMES_FLEET_ENV?.trim() || join11(ctx.home, ".hermes", "fl... `Plane returned ${response.status} for ${path}` + (credentials ? ` \u2014 the API key was rejected; check ${planeApiKeyNames(client.workspace).join(" / ")}` : response.status === 4... import { chmodSync as chmodSync2, closeSync, copyFileSync as copyFileSync2, existsSync as ex

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

7369if (typeof bin !== "string" || !bin) throw new Error(`${manifestPath} declares no skillex bin`); L7370: return { bin: resolve4(dirname4(manifestPath), bin), version: String(manifest.version ?? "unknown") }; L7371: } ... L7377: } catch (error) { L7378: process.stderr.write(`pjangler install is missing its @delorenj/skillex dependency (${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}); reinstall @delorenj/pjangler L7379: `); ... L7382: return await new Promise((resolveOutcome) => { L7383: const child = spawn(process.execPath, [cli.bin, ...args], { stdio: "inherit" }); L7384: const relay = (signal) => {

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L7369

7369Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L7369: if (typeof bin !== "string" || !bin) throw new Error(`${manifestPath} declares no skillex bin`); L7370: return { bin: resolve4(dirname4(manifestPath), bin), version: String(manifest.version ?? "unknown") }; L7371: } ... L7377: } catch (error) { L7378: process.stderr.write(`pjangler install is missing its @delorenj/skillex dependency (${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}); reinstall @delorenj/pjangler L7379: `); ... L7382: return await new Promise((resolveOutcome) => { L7383: const child = spawn(process.execPath, [cli.bin, ...args], { stdio: "inherit" }); L7384: const relay = (signal) => {

High

Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L7369

scripts/install-project-registry.mjsView file

Lines 1-35javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';

3import { homedir, userInfo } from 'node:os';

4import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';

5import { fileURLToPath }

dist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.pyView file

•path = dist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.py kind = payload_in_excluded_dir sizeBytes = 38660 magicHex = [redacted]

High

Payload In Excluded Dir

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

dist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.pyView on unpkg

•path = dist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 38660 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

dist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.pyView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

•path = dist/index.js kind = trigger_reachable_excluded_payload sizeBytes = 895794 triggerReachableSource = dist/index.js excludedPayload = .mise/scripts/versioning.sh

Critical

Trigger Reachable Excluded Directory Payload

A package entrypoint or install-reachable source explicitly loads and activates an executable-looking payload from a test, fixture, or hidden path.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

121// src/project/registryClient.ts L122: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L123: import { homedir as homedir2 } from "node:os";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L121

Findings

1 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalTrigger Reachable Excluded Directory Payloaddist/index.js

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionscripts/install-project-registry.mjs

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js

HighPayload In Excluded Dirdist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.py

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperdist/assets/project-notebook-skill/tests/test_project_hooks.py

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

Low

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @delorenj/pjangler@1.5.12.

See all versions of @delorenj/pjangler for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @delorenj/pjangler@1.5.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-08 16:40:55.004Z (UTC).

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