registry / @desplega.ai/agent-fs / 0.15.4
@desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.15.4
Agent-first filesystem backed by S3
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner’s credential-exfiltration and shell-execution labels are not supported by the inspected excerpts: telemetry uses anonymous product event data, and the child-process import is associated with explicit onboarding. The manifest shows only a prepublish-only build hook, so the source reviewed does not establish malicious behavior.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Telemetry runs when the application records telemetry events; onboarding behavior is activated by the user invoking the onboarding command.
Impact
The inspected telemetry excerpts do not show credential or environment harvesting. No confirmed attack surface was established.
Mechanism
The telemetry code posts event data to a fixed endpoint, while the onboarding command imports child-process execution support.
AI rationale
The scanner’s credential-exfiltration and shell-execution labels are not supported by the inspected excerpts: telemetry uses anonymous product event data, and the child-process import is associated with explicit onboarding. The manifest shows only a prepublish-only build hook, so the source reviewed does not establish malicious behavior.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.js
Network endpoints1
proxy.desplega.sh/v1/events
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 79.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The package has a prepublish-only build hook; it does not declare an install-time lifecycle hook.
- The CLI’s telemetry code supports opt-out through ANONYMIZED_TELEMETRY or DO_NOT_TRACK.
- Telemetry is sent as a POST to a fixed endpoint; inspected code constructs anonymous product event data.
- The CLI also contains child-process use in its explicit onboarding command.
Evidence against
- The inspected telemetry payload uses anonymous event metadata and aggregate usage counts, not environment variables, credentials, or command output.
- No concrete malicious behavior was established in the inspected CLI excerpts.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
292ORDER BY distance
L293: LIMIT ?`).all(r,t,JSON.stringify([...s]),Math.min(d,lI));if(c.length===0)break;let l=e.select({id:re.id,path:re.filePath,content:re.content,author:P.author,modifiedAt:P.modifiedAt}...
L294: (${T.path} >= ${d} AND ${T.path} < ${l})
...
L300: `:`[${n[d]}\r
L301: ]`;continue}if(o+=n[d],n[d]==="\\")i=!0;else if(s&&n[d]==="]")s=!1;else if(!s&&n[d]==="[")s=!0}try{new RegExp(o)}catch{return console.warn(`Could not convert regex pattern at ${t.c...
L302: data: {"driveId":"drive-id","at":"2026-09-30T12:00:00.000Z"}
...
L305:
L306: `}},"x-sse-events":{ready:{type:"object",required:["driveId","at"],properties:{driveId:{type:"string"},at:{type:"string",format:"date-time"}}},"file.changed":{type:"object",require...
L307: Start a daemon with \`agent-fs daemon start\` or se
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L2923var Ty=Object.create;var{getPrototypeOf:_y,defineProperty:Ui,getOwnPropertyNames:ky}=Object;var Qd=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;function Cy(e){return this[e]}var Oy,Ny,it=(e,t,r...
L4: Install with: brew install sqlite`)}var Zd=!1;var ec=f(()=>{jy()});import{mkdirSync as Hy,readFileSync as By,writeFileSync as Fi,existsSync as rc}from"fs";import{join as pn}from"pa...
L5: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
...
L247: END;
L248: `;function ac(e){if(!e.prepare("PRAGMA table_info(users)").all().some((s)=>s.name==="display_name"))e.exec("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN display_name TEXT");if(e.exec("CREATE INDEX...
L249: ${this.getCanonicalPath(e)}
...
L258: ${Wt.toHex(i)}`}getCanonicalPath({path:e}){if(this.uriEscapePath){let t=[];for(let o of e.split("/")){if(o?.length===0)continue;if(o==="
Findings
3 Critical5 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShell
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/cli.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.15.4.
See all versions of @desplega.ai/agent-fs for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.15.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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