registry / @desplega.ai/agent-fs / 0.16.4
@desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.16.4
Agent-first filesystem backed by S3
AI Security Review
scanned 18d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no consumer install hook or concrete attack behavior. The flagged network and shell operations are explained by package telemetry and the user-invoked MinIO onboarding flow.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Telemetry starts when the daemon starts; Docker commands run during the onboarding flow.
Impact
No confirmed credential disclosure, destructive behavior, stealth persistence, or other attack effect was established.
Mechanism
Telemetry sends anonymous event data and aggregate usage properties to the vendor endpoint. Onboarding checks and manages the named MinIO container.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no consumer install hook or concrete attack behavior. The flagged network and shell operations are explained by package telemetry and the user-invoked MinIO onboarding flow.
Network endpoints1
proxy.desplega.sh/v1/events
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 92.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes the bundled CLI and uses `prepublishOnly` to build it; no consumer install hook is declared.
- Telemetry can be disabled with its environment opt-out flags.
- Telemetry sends an anonymous install identifier and product events to the package vendor’s endpoint; the request body contains event metadata and supplied properties, not credentials.
- The daemon starts telemetry when it starts and reports aggregate counts and provider/platform categories in its events.
- Shell commands are used by the explicitly invoked onboarding flow to check and set up a named local MinIO Docker container.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
294ORDER BY distance
L295: LIMIT ?`).all(r,t,JSON.stringify([...s]),Math.min(d,OS));if(c.length===0)break;let l=e.select({id:re.id,path:re.filePath,content:re.content,author:D.author,modifiedAt:D.modifiedAt}...
L296: (${T.path} >= ${d} AND ${T.path} < ${l})
...
L302: `:`[${n[d]}\r
L303: ]`;continue}if(o+=n[d],n[d]==="\\")i=!0;else if(s&&n[d]==="]")s=!1;else if(!s&&n[d]==="[")s=!0}try{new RegExp(o)}catch{return console.warn(`Could not convert regex pattern at ${t.c...
L304: data: {"driveId":"drive-id","at":"2026-09-30T12:00:00.000Z"}
...
L307:
L308: `}},"x-sse-events":{ready:{type:"object",required:["driveId","at"],properties:{driveId:{type:"string"},at:{type:"string",format:"date-time"}}},"file.changed":{type:"object",require...
L309: Start a daemon with \`agent-fs daemon start\` or se
Critical
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L2943var Uy=Object.create;var{getPrototypeOf:Fy,defineProperty:Vi,getOwnPropertyNames:jy}=Object;var ic=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;function Hy(e){return this[e]}var By,qy,it=(e,t,r...
L4: Install with: brew install sqlite`)}var sc=!1;var ac=f(()=>{Jy()});import{mkdirSync as Qy,readFileSync as Zy,writeFileSync as Ki,existsSync as cc}from"fs";import{join as pn}from"pa...
L5: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
...
L247: END;
L248: `;function fc(e){if(!e.prepare("PRAGMA table_info(users)").all().some((s)=>s.name==="display_name"))e.exec("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN display_name TEXT");if(e.exec("CREATE INDEX...
L249: ${this.getCanonicalPath(e)}
...
L258: ${Yt.toHex(i)}`}getCanonicalPath({path:e}){if(this.uriEscapePath){let t=[];for(let o of e.split("/")){if(o?.length===0)continue;if(o==="
Findings
3 Critical5 High3 Medium6 Low
CriticalSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShell
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/cli.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.16.4.
See all versions of @desplega.ai/agent-fs for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.16.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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