--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@desplega.ai/agent-fs/v/0.18.2" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@desplega.ai/agent-fs/v/0.18.2.md" package: "@desplega.ai/agent-fs" report_status: "published" title: "@desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.18.2 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "0.18.2" --- # @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.18.2 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 17 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 0.18.2 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Source inspection found runtime product telemetry and user-directed Docker setup, but no concrete credential exfiltration or other attack behavior. The scanner’s network and command-execution indicators match these package functions. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-17T18:34:56.131Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-17T18:36:11.571Z - **Download time:** 753 ms - **Static scan time:** 923 ms - **AI review time:** 73764 ms - **Total time:** 75440 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No malicious attack surface was identified. The observed network activity is anonymous product telemetry during server operation, and the child-process behavior supports interactive MinIO onboarding. - **Trigger:** Telemetry begins when the server starts; MinIO commands run through the onboarding setup. - **Impact:** The inspected behavior does not expose credentials or perform an unrequested harmful change. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-17T18:36:11.571Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Telemetry posts aggregate usage and platform properties to the package vendor’s endpoint and stores a random install identifier in the application configuration. Onboarding asks before starting or creating a MinIO container. - **Rationale:** Source inspection found runtime product telemetry and user-directed Docker setup, but no concrete credential exfiltration or other attack behavior. The scanner’s network and command-execution indicators match these package functions. - **Files touched:** dist/cli.js - **Network endpoints:** https://proxy.desplega.sh/v1/events ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** High - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** package.json exposes dist/cli.js as the CLI; its only lifecycle hook builds the package before publication., Server startup sends anonymous telemetry to the vendor-associated endpoint. The payload contains aggregate usage counts, storage and embedding provider categories, platform, and a random install identifier; telemetry can be disabled with the documented environment flags., The child-process use is in the onboarding command’s MinIO setup, which prompts before starting or creating a container. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.18.2. - Review the evidence and your use of @desplega.ai/agent-fs@0.18.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L720: L721: `}},"x-sse-events":{ready:{type:"object",required:["driveId","at"],properties:{driveId:{type:"string"},at:{type:"string",format:"date-time"}}},"file.changed":{type:"object",require... L722: Start a daemon with \`agent-fs daemon start\` or set AGENT_FS_API_URL to connect to a remote server.`),process.exit(1)}Fc=new xT({name:"agent-fs",version:Ge},{capabilities:{tools:{... ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% Package source references shell execution. ### 5. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: var ib=Object.create;var{getPrototypeOf:sb,defineProperty:Is,getOwnPropertyNames:ab}=Object;var tl=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;function db(e){return this[e]}var cb,lb,ct=(e,t,r... L4: Install with: brew install sqlite`)}var rl=!1;var nl=g(()=>{vb()});import{mkdirSync as bb,readFileSync as wb,writeFileSync as As,existsSync as ol}from"fs";import{join as On}from"pa... L5: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users ( ... L254: DELETE FROM meta WHERE key = 'vec_int8_index'; L255: `),!Dn(n))n.exec(Wo);return ll(n),Ob(n,{schema:ae})}var pe=g(()=>{nl();ot();sl();Fr()});var gl;var fl=g(()=>{gl={name:"agent-fs",version:"0.18.2",packageManager:"bun@1.4.1",private... L256: ${this.getCanonicalPath(e)} ... L265: ${er.toHex(i)}`}getCanonicalPath({path:e}){if(this.uriEscapePath){let t=[];for(let o of e.spli ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L707: }; L708: `,ng;var gd=g(()=>{ng=new WeakMap});import{and as ig,eq as Fi,inArray as wA}from"drizzle-orm";async function ji(e,t,r,n){let o=e.$client,i=[],s=new Set;while(i.length= ${d} AND ${C.path} < ${l}) ... L715: `:`[${n[d]}\r L716: ]`;continue}if(o+=n[d],n[d]==="\\")i=!0;else if(s&&n[d]==="]")s=!1;else if(!s&&n[d]==="[")s=!0}try{new RegExp(o)}catch{return console.warn(`Could not convert regex pattern at ${t.c... L717: data: {"driveId":"drive-id","at":"2026-09-30T12:00:00.000Z"} ... L720: L721: `}},"x-sse-events":{ready:{type:"object",required:["driveId","at"],properties:{driveId:{type:"string"},at:{type:"string",format:"date-time"}}},"file.changed":{type:"object",require... L722: Start a daemon with \`agent-fs daemon start\` or set AGENT_FS_API_ ``` ### 10. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3: var ib=Object.create;var{getPrototypeOf:sb,defineProperty:Is,getOwnPropertyNames:ab}=Object;var tl=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;function db(e){return this[e]}var cb,lb,ct=(e,t,r... L4: Install with: brew install sqlite`)}var rl=!1;var nl=g(()=>{vb()});import{mkdirSync as bb,readFileSync as wb,writeFileSync as As,existsSync as ol}from"fs";import{join as On}from"pa... L5: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users ( ... L254: DELETE FROM meta WHERE key = 'vec_int8_index'; L255: `),!Dn(n))n.exec(Wo);return ll(n),Ob(n,{schema:ae})}var pe=g(()=>{nl();ot();sl();Fr()});var gl;var fl=g(()=>{gl={name:"agent-fs",version:"0.18.2",packageManager:"bun@1.4.1",private... L256: ${this.getCanonicalPath(e)} ... L265: ${er.toHex(i)}`}getCanonicalPath({path:e}){if(this.uriEscapePath){let t=[];for(let o of e.spli ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1127: `);let a=!0;for(let d of t){let c=d.ok?"\u2713":"\u2717";if(console.log(` ${c} ${d.name}: ${d.message}`),!d.ok)a=!1}if(console.log(),a)console.log("All checks passed.");else conso... L1128: ${c.name} [${c.role}]${u}`);let{drives:p}=await e.get(`/orgs/${c.id}/drives`);for(let m of p){let f=[];if(m.isDefault)f.push("default");if(d===m.id)f.push("active");let h=f.length>... L1129: This invites the user to the organization that owns the current drive. The user will have access to all drives in the org based on their role.`).action(async(n,o)=>{try{let i=await... L1130: To connect to a remote server, configure manually: ... L1138: User registered: ${d}`),console.log(`API Key: ${c.apiKey}`),console.log(`Org ID: ${l[0]?.id}`)}catch(c){if(c.message?.includes("UNIQUE"))console.log(`User ${d ``` ### 12. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L3: var ib=Object.create;var{getPrototypeOf:sb,defineProperty:Is,getOwnPropertyNames:ab}=Object;var tl=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;function db(e){return this[e]}var cb,lb,ct=(e,t,r... L4: Install with: brew install sqlite`)}var rl=!1;var nl=g(()=>{vb()});import{mkdirSync as bb,readFileSync as wb,writeFileSync as As,existsSync as ol}from"fs";import{join as On}from"pa... L5: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users ( ... L254: DELETE FROM meta WHERE key = 'vec_int8_index'; L255: `),!Dn(n))n.exec(Wo);return ll(n),Ob(n,{schema:ae})}var pe=g(()=>{nl();ot();sl();Fr()});var gl;var fl=g(()=>{gl={name:"agent-fs",version:"0.18.2",packageManager:"bun@1.4.1",private... L256: ${this.getCanonicalPath(e)} ... L265: ${er.toHex(i)}`}getCanonicalPath({path:e} ``` ### 13. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L3: var ib=Object.create;var{getPrototypeOf:sb,defineProperty:Is,getOwnPropertyNames:ab}=Object;var tl=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;function db(e){return this[e]}var cb,lb,ct=(e,t,r... L4: Install with: brew install sqlite`)}var rl=!1;var nl=g(()=>{vb()});import{mkdirSync as bb,readFileSync as wb,writeFileSync as As,existsSync as ol}from"fs";import{join as On}from"pa... L5: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users ( ... L254: DELETE FROM meta WHERE key = 'vec_int8_index'; L255: `),!Dn(n))n.exec(Wo);return ll(n),Ob(n,{schema:ae})}var pe=g(()=>{nl();ot();sl();Fr()});var gl;var fl=g(()=>{gl={name:"agent-fs",version:"0.18.2",packageManager:"bun@1.4.1",private... L256: ${this.getCanonicalPath(e)} ... L265: ${er.toHex(i)}`}g ``` ### 14. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js L1127: `);let a=!0;for(let d of t){let c=d.ok?"\u2713":"\u2717";if(console.log(` ${c} ${d.name}: ${d.message}`),!d.ok)a=!1}if(console.log(),a)console.log("All checks passed.");else conso... L1128: ${c.name} [${c.role}]${u}`);let{drives:p}=await e.get(`/orgs/${c.id}/drives`);for(let m of p){let f=[];if(m.isDefault)f.push("default");if(d===m.id)f.push("active");let h=f.length>... L1129: This invites the user to the organization that owns the current drive. The user will have access to all drives in the org based on their role.`).action(async(n,o)=>{try{let i=await... L1130: To connect to a remote server, configure manually: ... L1138: User registered: ${d}`),console.log(`API Key: ${c.apiKey}`),console.log(`Org ``` ### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 16. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 15 - **Optional dependencies:** 7 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 22 ### Published dependency entries - @aws-sdk/client-s3 ^3.750.0 (Dependency) - @chonkiejs/core 0.0.12 (Dependency) - @duckdb/node-api 1.5.3-r.3 (Dependency) - @google/genai ^1.45.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.27.1 (Dependency) - commander ^14.0.3 (Dependency) - diff ^8.0.3 (Dependency) - drizzle-orm ^0.44.0 (Dependency) - hono ^4.12.8 (Dependency) - msgpackr ^1 (Dependency) - node-llama-cpp ^3.17.1 (Dependency) - openai ^6.29.0 (Dependency) - sqlite-vec ^0.1.9 (Dependency) - unpdf 1.9.0 (Dependency) - zod ^3.24.0 (Dependency) - @desplega.ai/agent-fs-fuse-linux-arm64 ^0.18.2 (OptionalDependency) - @desplega.ai/agent-fs-fuse-linux-x64 ^0.18.2 (OptionalDependency) - sqlite-vec-darwin-arm64 ^0.1.9 (OptionalDependency) - sqlite-vec-darwin-x64 ^0.1.9 (OptionalDependency) - sqlite-vec-linux-arm64 ^0.1.9 (OptionalDependency) - sqlite-vec-linux-x64 ^0.1.9 (OptionalDependency) - sqlite-vec-windows-x64 ^0.1.9 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @desplega.ai/agent-fs - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.18.2 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-17T18:33:13.139Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-09T10:04:23.865Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-05T00:30:25.918Z - **Known versions:** 49 - **Latest version:** 0.18.18 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Agent-first filesystem backed by S3 - **Maintainers:** tarasyarema, 3z3 - **Keywords:** agent, filesystem, s3, mcp, cli - **Runtime engines:** bun: \>=1.4.0 - **Artifact files:** 4 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 486,898 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()