@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.1.21
The unified framework for building Command Center-compatible resource applications, widgets, workspaces, connections, themes, and embeds.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a real automatic agent-extension lifecycle risk, but the write scope is namespaced and the remote path is authenticated and configuration-gated. Static inspection found no secret harvesting, arbitrary shell execution during postinstall, or self-dependency chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs a postinstall hook that automatically installs agent skills into the consumer project.
- The installer writes packaged content under the consumer project's .agents skills control surface.
- When configured with an MCP URL and access token, postinstall fetches remote skill content and writes it under a second agent-skill namespace.
- The remote synchronization requires both a configured URL and access token, and failures do not block installation.
- The installers restrict paths, reject symlinks, and use package-specific namespaces.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.1.21.
See all versions of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.1.21 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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