registry / @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk / 0.4.2
@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.4.2
The framework-neutral SDK for building Command Center-compatible resource applications, navigation, layouts, themes, feedback, and embeds.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiPostinstall performs first-party setup of this SDK's own agent-skill namespace, with an optional same-vendor MCP skill sync that runs only when the operator already configured the endpoint and token. That automatic agent-surface write is a guarded lifecycle risk and is not a hidden foreign control-surface hijack or a separate exfiltration chain.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm postinstall on a non-global install when INIT_CWD names a consumer project directory.
Impact
Agent runtimes that load .agents/skills receive package-authored skill text, and optionally remotely supplied skill text, without a separate install command. Writes stay inside the command-center and mainsequence namespaces.
Mechanism
cli/postinstall.mjs calls installAgentSkills unconditionally for that project, then calls installMcpAgentSkills after an authenticated catalog fetch unless COMMAND_CENTER_SDK_MCP_POSTINSTALL is 0 or the URL and token are missing.
AI rationale
Postinstall performs first-party setup of this SDK's own agent-skill namespace, with an optional same-vendor MCP skill sync that runs only when the operator already configured the endpoint and token. That automatic agent-surface write is a guarded lifecycle risk and is not a hidden foreign control-surface hijack or a separate exfiltration chain.
Evidence
package.jsoncli/postinstall.mjscli/install-agent-skills.mjscli/install-mcp-skills.mjscli/mcp-platform-skills.mjs.agents/skills/command-center.agents/skills/mainsequence
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json postinstall runs node ./cli/postinstall.mjs on install.
- That hook calls installAgentSkills for the consumer INIT_CWD and labels the command npm postinstall.
- Copied skills land in the consumer .agents/skills/command-center tree and stale entries in that namespace are removed.
- If a Main Sequence MCP URL and MAINSEQUENCE_ACCESS_TOKEN are already set, postinstall also fetches a skill catalog and writes it under .agents/skills/mainsequence unless COMMAND_CENTER_SDK_MCP_POSTINSTALL is 0.
Evidence against
- Global installs and the SDK source repository are skipped, and the local copy stays inside the command-center skill namespace with symlink and path checks.
- The MCP URL is taken only from caller configuration, the bearer token is sent only to that URL, and a missing configuration skips the network step.
- No install-time shell, eval, or runtime dependency on this same package name was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystem
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./cli/postinstall.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node ./cli/postinstall.mjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgcli/install-agent-skills.mjsView file
1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface:
L377: resolvedProjectDir,
L378: ".agents",
L379: "skills",
...
L428: const skillsParent = dirname(destinationRoot);
L429: await mkdir(skillsParent, { recursive: true });
L430: const stageRoot = await mkdtemp(join(skillsParent, ".command-center-stage-"));
...
L439: const staged = join(stageRoot, ...item.relativePath.split("/"));
L440: await mkdir(dirname(staged), { recursive: true });
L441: await cp(item.source, staged, {
L442: recursive: true,
...
L448:
L449: await mkdir(destinationRoot, { recursive: true });
Write operation from cli/install-agent-skills.mjs:
L377: resolvedProjectDir,
L378: ".agents",
L379: "skills",
...
L428: const skillsParent = dirname(destinationRoot);
L429: await mkdir(skillsParent, { recursive: t
Findings
1 Critical6 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackcli/install-agent-skills.mjs
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedstyles.css
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritycli/application-sdk-maintenance.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritycli/code-repository-sync-local-ops.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/embed/static-site.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturecli/application-sdk-maintenance.mjs
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.4.2.
See all versions of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.4.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.