registry / @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk / 0.5.7
@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7
The framework-neutral SDK for building Command Center-compatible resource applications, navigation, layouts, themes, feedback, and embeds.
AI Security Review
scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiPostinstall unconditionally installs first-party skills on the shared .agents/skills control surface and, when existing environment credentials are present, forwards the access token to an unrestricted operator URL before writing remote skills. That is guarded package-owned agent setup plus conditional credential exposure, not a hidden foreign hijack or a fixed exfiltration host.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm postinstall on a non-global install when INIT_CWD is set; MCP sync also requires the token and endpoint variables and is skipped when COMMAND_CENTER_SDK_MCP_POSTINSTALL is 0.
Impact
Coding agents that load .agents/skills receive these skill instructions. The configured access token can be sent to any http or https host named in the environment.
Mechanism
The hook copies packaged skill files into a package-owned namespace. It then POSTs JSON-RPC with a Bearer token to the configured MCP URL and installs the validated catalog into a second namespace.
AI rationale
Postinstall unconditionally installs first-party skills on the shared .agents/skills control surface and, when existing environment credentials are present, forwards the access token to an unrestricted operator URL before writing remote skills. That is guarded package-owned agent setup plus conditional credential exposure, not a hidden foreign hijack or a fixed exfiltration host.
Evidence
package.jsoncli/postinstall.mjscli/install-agent-skills.mjscli/install-mcp-skills.mjscli/mcp-platform-skills.mjs.agents/skills/command-center.agents/skills/mainsequence
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json registers a registry postinstall that runs cli/postinstall.mjs.
- That hook calls installAgentSkills and writes packaged skills under the consumer project .agents/skills/command-center namespace.
- Unless COMMAND_CENTER_SDK_MCP_POSTINSTALL is 0, postinstall uses COMMAND_CENTER_SDK_MCP_URL, MAINSEQUENCE_MCP_URL, or MAINSEQUENCE_ENDPOINT plus MAINSEQUENCE_ACCESS_TOKEN.
- The MCP URL check allows any http or https host, the access token is sent as a Bearer header, and returned skills are written under .agents/skills/mainsequence.
Evidence against
- Global installs and the SDK source repository are skipped, and MCP failures do not fail the npm install.
- There is no dependency on this package name, no eval or hidden payload, and no hardcoded exfiltration host.
- Skill writes stay inside the command-center and mainsequence namespaces and refuse symlink destinations.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./cli/postinstall.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node ./cli/postinstall.mjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgcli/install-agent-skills.mjsView file
1Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface:
L377: resolvedProjectDir,
L378: ".agents",
L379: "skills",
...
L428: const skillsParent = dirname(destinationRoot);
L429: await mkdir(skillsParent, { recursive: true });
L430: const stageRoot = await mkdtemp(join(skillsParent, ".command-center-stage-"));
...
L439: const staged = join(stageRoot, ...item.relativePath.split("/"));
L440: await mkdir(dirname(staged), { recursive: true });
L441: await cp(item.source, staged, {
L442: recursive: true,
...
L448:
L449: await mkdir(destinationRoot, { recursive: true });
Write operation from cli/install-agent-skills.mjs:
L377: resolvedProjectDir,
L378: ".agents",
L379: "skills",
...
L428: const skillsParent = dirname(destinationRoot);
L429: await mkdir(skillsParent, { recursive: t
Findings
1 Critical4 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackcli/install-agent-skills.mjs
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedstyles.css
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritycli/application-sdk-maintenance.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritycli/code-repository-sync-local-ops.mjs
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7.
See all versions of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.